User:Visviva/Philosophical Studies 200801

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This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words found in the 2008-01 issue of Philosophical Studies which did not have English entries in the English Wiktionary when this list was created.

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56694 tokens ‧ 48942 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 4483 types ‧ 74 (~ 1.651%) words before cleaning ‧ 

2008-01[edit]

  1. aggretable
    • 2007 October 19, Rivka Weinberg, “Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9168-y: 
      Woodward argues that even if procreators or formulators of population policy intend the overall benefit that their actions confer on future people, neither their intentions nor the beneficial effects of their actions outweigh or negate the wrong done because the violation of specific rights “are not simply aggretable into some more fundamental interest in being as well off as possible, all things considered.
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  2. antirealists
  3. blindsighted
  4. blindsighters
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      For we could then say that the finegrained sensorimotor connection between what blindsighters perceive in space and their ability to point to it is guided by sensorimotor-subjective vision , even though they lack self-conscious vision for that cognitive and practical task.
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  5. categoricals
    • 2007 December 15, R. Lanier Anderson, “Comments on Wayne Martin, Theories of Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9162-4: 
      Categorical judgments constitute the matter of the remaining judgments, to be sure, but one must not on this account believe, as several logicians do, that both hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are nothing more than various clothings of categoricals and hence may be wholly traced back to these latter.
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  6. clothings
    • 2007 December 15, R. Lanier Anderson, “Comments on Wayne Martin, Theories of Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9162-4: 
      Categorical judgments constitute the matter of the remaining judgments, to be sure, but one must not on this account believe, as several logicians do, that both hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are nothing more than various clothings of categoricals and hence may be wholly traced back to these latter.
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  7. cognitions
  8. conceptualizers
  9. consequentialsm
    • 2007 October 19, Rivka Weinberg, “Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9168-y: 
      6 It doesn’t apply to theories that deem actions wrong insofar as they make things worse for people in general, regardless of identity (wide person-affecting theories), 7 e. g. , some versions of contractarianism, nor does it apply to theories that deem actions wrong insofar as they negatively affect states of affairs, e. g. , consequentialsm.
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  10. contentful
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      Indeed, it seems to me that the special character of non-conceptually contentful perceptual states entails that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense—although, to be sure, the presence of this non-conceptual content does not necessarily exhaust the total content of such states.
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  11. contentless
  12. contentually
  13. contractarianism
    • 2007 October 19, Rivka Weinberg, “Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9168-y: 
      6 It doesn’t apply to theories that deem actions wrong insofar as they make things worse for people in general, regardless of identity (wide person-affecting theories), 7 e. g. , some versions of contractarianism, nor does it apply to theories that deem actions wrong insofar as they negatively affect states of affairs, e. g. , consequentialsm.
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  14. copulist
  15. counterfactually
    • 2007 October 17, Hannah Ginsborg, “Was Kant a nonconceptualist?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9163-3: 
      Rather, to speak of sensibility in isolation from understanding is to speak counterfactually: it is to speak of what would be left of human perceptual experience if the synthesis of imagination did not involve the consciousness of normativity.
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  16. criterial
  17. deductivist
  18. demonstratives
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      I want to stress that the above discussion of demonstratives does not undercut the view that fineness of grain in visual experiences can be presented conceptually in demonstrative judgments or thoughts made on the basis of experience.
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  19. dualistically
  20. eliminativism
    • 2007 December 15, R. Lanier Anderson, “Comments on Wayne Martin, Theories of Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9162-4: 
      This revolutionary eliminativism necessitated a broad program of reduction, in which the various forms of categorical judgments were traced back to equivalent thetic ones—thereby also requiring reduction of the classical inference forms of the categorical syllogism, since those were standardly defined by appeal to the types of categorical judgment included as their constituents.
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  21. enantiomorphy
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      As I have said, the first goal of this paper is to develop a Kantian argument for the existence of non-conceptual content from our cognition of enantiomorphy.
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  22. eudaimonism
  23. existentialized
    • 2007 November 23, Günter Zöller, “Kant and the problem of existential judgment: critical comments on Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9175-z: 
      Heidegger’s phenomenology from this period of his work can be described as existentialized transcendental philosophy—a brand of (clandestine or unorthodox) Kantianism that replaces the detached, formal investigations of the a priori conditions of experience to be found in Kant and his late-19th century neo-Kantian successors (chiefly Herman Cohen and Paul Natorp) with an exploration of the vital, subjectively experienced strata underlying those very abstract, transcendental conditions.
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  24. explanationist
  25. explicitation
    • 2007 December 15, R. Lanier Anderson, “Comments on Wayne Martin, Theories of Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9162-4: 
      Further, while Frege’s judgment stroke has the merit of making this distinction fully explicit, and thereby available to do logical work, there are still, as Martin recognizes, real limits on explicitation here—at least within a Fregean context.
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  26. expressibility
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      Thus the possible natural linguistic expressibility of every concept suffices to guarantee the inherently intersubjective and non-solipsistic character of concepts, even for pre-linguistic humans and non-humans.
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  27. finegrained
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      This in turn would neatly avoid the obvious paradox that in blindsight brute, non-conscious, non-unified, purposeless mental processing somehow exerts finegrained control over our conscious cognition and intentional body movements.
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  28. foundationalist
    • 2007 November 23, Günter Zöller, “Kant and the problem of existential judgment: critical comments on Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9175-z: 
      When Martin rejects a foundationalist as well a subjectivist understanding of phenomenology (5f. , instead stressing phenomenology’s “characteristic concern” with “the structure of experience” (6), then he finds himself in perfect agreement with the brand of phenomenology introduced and carried out in Heidegger’s Being and Time and in the associated “phenomenological interpretations” (Heidegger’s term) of main works in the history of philosophy, chiefly of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason .
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  29. hypercomplex
  30. intersubjectively
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      On the contrary, it seems very plausible to hold that pre-linguistic human children and many non-human animals can deploy concepts as object-categorizing, object-classifying, object-discriminating, and object-identifying cognitive devices, that these concepts can be deployed in the absence of the objects represented by them, that these concepts are intersubjectively shareable by other non-human animals and by human animals alike, and also that these concepts are immediately present in their mental lives both causally and phenomenologically, but not by means of linguistic vehicles.
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  31. judgeable
  32. judger
  33. macrological
  34. mediately
    • 2007 December 15, R. Lanier Anderson, “Comments on Wayne Martin, Theories of Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9162-4: 
      And then, when Kant treats the example judgment, ‘All bodies are divisible,’ he speaks indifferently of “the concept of the divisible” and of the whole judgment as being that higher representation, or “function of unity,” which we use to represent (mediately) the objects picked out by the subject term.
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  35. misdescribes
  36. misidentification
  37. modelable
  38. neurobiologically
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      On the contrary, it seems to me far more plausible that blindsighted people are genuinely visually conscious in those areas, but in a way that is in some respects intrinsically phenomenologically, semantically, and neurobiologically different from the visual consciousness of normal self-consciously sighted people.
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  39. nonconceptual
  40. nonconceptualism
    • 2007 October 17, Hannah Ginsborg, “Was Kant a nonconceptualist?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9163-3: 
      Part of the appeal of nonconceptualism as a view in its own right is that it seems to do better justice than conceptualism to what we might call the primitive character of perception relative to thought and judgment.
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  41. nonconceptualist
    • 2007 October 17, Hannah Ginsborg, “Was Kant a nonconceptualist?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9163-3: 
      But it does not interpret it as the nonconceptualist does, by supposing that we can isolate, within human cognition, actual representations that can be ascribed to sensibility alone (where sensibility is understood in a broad sense which includes imagination).
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  42. occurrently
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      Hence it is not so very shocking after all for me to hold that all mental states, even tacit computational information processing states, are also occurrently conscious.
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  43. omnitemporal
    • 2007 October 24, Pamela Hieronymi, “Sher’s defense of blame”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9167-z: 
      Sher then defends both B 9 and D, devoting most of his time to D. He defends D by means of an interesting argument to the conclusion that, if morality is “practical, universal, omnitemporal, and (in [a] specified sense) overriding and inescapable” then a commitment to it will result in D. All too briefly: to be committed to morality as practical, i. e. , as action guiding, requires being motivated to act in accord with its dictates—and so requires having a desire.
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  44. paratactic
  45. phenomenalism
  46. preconceptual
    • 2007 October 17, Hannah Ginsborg, “Was Kant a nonconceptualist?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9163-3: 
      On this assumption, Kant’s claim that perceptual synthesis is due to the spontaneity of understanding amounts to the claim that it consists in the application of antecedently possessed concepts to whatever preconceptual material is presented to us by sensibility.
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  47. progressivist
  48. sortal
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      For example, many concepts have a content whose underlying structure is determined by the logical syntax of predicates, sortal terms, and logical constants in elementary logic, or in some conservative extension or deviant of elementary logic.
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  49. stablest
    • 2007 November 24, Eric Brown, “Contemplative withdrawal in the Hellenistic age”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9164-2: 
      In the decades before Alexander, during some of the stablest, most peaceful decades for polis-centered life in Attica, Plato and Aristotle insisted that a person in ordinary circumstances can do no better than to withdraw from public affairs and dedicate oneself to the contemplation of eternal truths.
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  50. standardly
    • 2007 December 15, R. Lanier Anderson, “Comments on Wayne Martin, Theories of Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9162-4: 
      This revolutionary eliminativism necessitated a broad program of reduction, in which the various forms of categorical judgments were traced back to equivalent thetic ones—thereby also requiring reduction of the classical inference forms of the categorical syllogism, since those were standardly defined by appeal to the types of categorical judgment included as their constituents.
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  51. subjectivist
    • 2007 November 23, Günter Zöller, “Kant and the problem of existential judgment: critical comments on Wayne Martin’s Theories of Judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9175-z: 
      When Martin rejects a foundationalist as well a subjectivist understanding of phenomenology (5f. , instead stressing phenomenology’s “characteristic concern” with “the structure of experience” (6), then he finds himself in perfect agreement with the brand of phenomenology introduced and carried out in Heidegger’s Being and Time and in the associated “phenomenological interpretations” (Heidegger’s term) of main works in the history of philosophy, chiefly of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason .
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  52. subpersonal
    • 2007 October 25, Robert Hanna, “Kantian non-conceptualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9166-0: 
      If the Deep Consciousness Thesis is true, then can see the beginnings of a solution to what Ray Jackendoff aptly calls the mind-mind problem , which is how it is ever possible for there be genuine two-way causal or semantic interaction across the theoretical and normative gap between the Conscious Mind (or first-personal information processing) and the Computational Mind (or subpersonal information processing) 46 The Kantian non-conceptualist solution to the mind-mind problem, along with the Deep Consciousness Thesis, is that subpersonal processing is still in fact first-personal, conscious processing even though it is non-conceptual and non-self-conscious .
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  53. surveyable
    • 2007 December 11, Hans Sluga, “Wayne Martin on judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9174-0: 
      They present themselves not as surveyable wholes but as complex fields of family resemblances , that is, of intersecting and alternating affinities and kinship relations.
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  54. syntheticity
  55. theorizers
  56. transferral
  57. twelvefold
  58. twinhood
  59. unavoidability
    • 2007 October 24, Pamela Hieronymi, “Sher’s defense of blame”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9167-z: 
      [and] the relation between the desire-belief pairs and the dispositions [characteristic of blame] is merely contingent, it would not be inconsistent for someone to acknowledge both the moral importance and the unavoidability of the desire-belief pairs but to deny either the moral importance or the unavoidability of the dispositions to which they standardly give rise.
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  60. underdetermination
  61. underdetermined
  62. unobservables
  63. unsurveyable
    • 2007 December 11, Hans Sluga, “Wayne Martin on judgment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 137, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9174-0: 
      It is that hyper-complex and therefore unsurveyable domains can be examined only in their concrete specificity by drawing samples from them that we can compare and contrast with each other, and from which we may be able to derive at most some weak and uniformly conjectural conclusions concerning the entire domain.
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  64. velcro

Sequestered[edit]