User:Visviva/Philosophical Studies 200807

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This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words found in the 2008-07 issue of Philosophical Studies which did not have English entries in the English Wiktionary when this list was created.

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59331 tokens ‧ 51017 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3753 types ‧ 74 (~ 1.972%) words before cleaning ‧ 

2008-07[edit]

  1. abstracta
  2. apriority
    • 2008 April 5, Ásta Sveinsdóttir, “Essentiality conferred”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4: 
      The apriority is, however, not to be merely as a result of the fixing of the meaning of the term, such as when I dub my cat ‘Cat’ and then claim to know a priori that my cat is called ‘Cat’.
      add - notemp
  3. assertable
  4. bruteness
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      Ask him why there are no donkeyless D worlds, and here he may well appeal to bruteness, while insisting that this is a more plausible candidate for bruteness than the claim that necessarily D’s being instantiated is sufficient for the presence of a donkey.
      add - notemp
  5. compatibilist
  6. concreta
  7. conditionalization
  8. conferralism
  9. conferralist
    • 2008 April 5, Ásta Sveinsdóttir, “Essentiality conferred”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4: 
      Since the conferralist about essentiality is committed to the view that essentiality is conferred by ideal versions of us concept users, it seems that if there were no people and hence no conceptual practices that people engaged in, then there would be no essentiality, on the conferralist view.
      add - notemp
  10. conventionalism
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      I therefore encourage 4Dists to become even more radical—embrace the conventionalism that will deflate the debate between 3Dists and 4Dists.
      add - notemp
  11. conventionalist
  12. conventionalists
  13. counterfactually
  14. defensibility
    • 2008 April 1, Carolina Sartorio, “Moral inertia”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9229-x: 
      However, there is a particular objection to the rational defensibility of moral inertia that has to do with the intelligibility of the concept of deflection in general.
      add - notemp
  15. degreed
  16. derivatively
  17. dialetheism
  18. dialetheists
  19. disjuncts
  20. dispensability
  21. disquotation
  22. donkeyhood
  23. donkeyless
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      Ask him why there are no donkeyless D worlds, and here he may well appeal to bruteness, while insisting that this is a more plausible candidate for bruteness than the claim that necessarily D’s being instantiated is sufficient for the presence of a donkey.
      add - notemp
  24. donkeyness
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      We can, in some weak sense, save donkeys from conventionality if we identify them with items that are non-conventional, but we have not thereby saved a whole lot of donkeyness.
      add - notemp
  25. dualists
  26. ersatzism
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      One of Lewis’s challenges to linguistic ersatzism focuses on the inelimanibility of modality in connecting different levels of ontological description.
      add - notemp
  27. ersatzists
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      Linguistic ersatzists hold that even if Lewis happened to be right about which hunks of stuff there are, he would still be wrong about modality.
      add - notemp
  28. evidentially
  29. explandum
  30. expressivism
    • 2008 April 5, Ásta Sveinsdóttir, “Essentiality conferred”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4: 
      Given that on a conferralist account, essentiality is a reflection of our values and interests, as expressed in our conceptual practices, the reader may wonder how it relates to expressivism.
      add - notemp
  31. expressivist
    • 2008 April 5, Ásta Sveinsdóttir, “Essentiality conferred”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4: 
      The short answer is that, although it may share some of the motivations behind expressivist (and projectivist) views, in content it is quite different.
      add - notemp
  32. externalist
    • 2008 April 5, Ásta Sveinsdóttir, “Essentiality conferred”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4: 
      Or perhaps it is to be a more externalist notion such as Wiggins’s where A’s being P is conceivable just in case it is consistent with the concept of A that it be P and where concept is understood in a roughly Fregean sense?
      add - notemp
  33. genuses
    • 2008 April 19, C. S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan, “Backwards explanation”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9228-y: 
      Perhaps functional explanation is one of the fundamental genuses of explanation (as Aristotle thought), and the rule against backwards explanations only applies to non-functional ones.
      add - notemp
  34. incompatibilist
    • 2008 April 9, Peter A. Graham, “A defense of local miracle compatibilism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9226-0: 
      It would be perverse for an incompatibilist to offer the Consequence Argument with her own mere partial theory of ability and then complain about a reply to that argument that it is offered in the absence of a complete theory of ability.
      add - notemp
  35. indeterministic
  36. infinitary
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      We need connecting axioms : conditionals to the effect that if —here follows a very long, perhaps infinitary, description of the arrangement and properties of the point particles— then there is a talking donkey.
      add - notemp
  37. informationally
  38. internalist
  39. interveners
  40. linguisitic
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      I have proposed my own answer to the Donkey Problem when developing my version of linguisitic ersatizism, but the answer does not depend on the details of linguistic ersatzism.
      add - notemp
  41. mereological
  42. metaontology
  43. necessitarianism
  44. nominalistic
  45. ontically
  46. ontologists
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      In Part 1, I will explain the Donkey Problem and argue that it is significant for all ontologists, not just for the modal ontologists that were Lewis’s target.
      add - notemp
  47. paraphrasable
  48. possibilia
  49. preexistent
    • 2008 April 1, Carolina Sartorio, “Moral inertia”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9229-x: 
      I suggest that this is because in this case you wouldn’t be diverting a preexistent train of events (either potentially harming or benefiting) from a group of people onto a different group of people.
      add - notemp
  50. pretheoretical
    • 2008 April 23, J. L. Dowell, “Empirical metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9224-2: 
      Let’s grant, as seems plausible, that Jackson and Chalmers are right to hold that knowledge of what it takes to be a T, according to our pretheoretical notion of Ts, has an important role to play in settling metaphysical disputes about the nature of Ts. The considerations raised here suggest that the role that intuitions about hypothetical cases play in the Jackson and Chalmers account is better played by our intuitions about how to describe cases we believe to be actual.
      add - notemp
  51. prioricist
  52. projectivist
    • 2008 April 5, Ásta Sveinsdóttir, “Essentiality conferred”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4: 
      The short answer is that, although it may share some of the motivations behind expressivist (and projectivist) views, in content it is quite different.
      add - notemp
  53. proximally
    • 2008 April 19, C. S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan, “Backwards explanation”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9228-y: 
      A horticulturalist might know that scarlet pimpernels always close up before rain without having any idea whether it is increasing moisture levels, or decreasing barometric pressure, or registering loss of light due to stormclouds, or whatever, that they are proximally responding to.
      add - notemp
  54. selectional
    • 2008 April 19, C. S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan, “Backwards explanation”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9228-y: 
      A second attempt to use the notion of biological function does not require that the ‘real’ explanation being offered is one in terms of a past selectional history, even though it may be agreed that the past selectional history is part of the truth-maker for the function claim.
      add - notemp
  55. situationally
  56. sociohistorical
    • 2008 April 5, Ásta Sveinsdóttir, “Essentiality conferred”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9230-4: 
      Use of a concept can reach backwards and forwards in time and space or be limited to a particular sociohistorical context, all depending on whether the concept users share the concept commitments or not.
      add - notemp
  57. supervenience
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      Sider claims “the strength of the [supervenience argument against coincidence] is compromised, since [the friend of coincidence] can at least uphold some supervenience claim” ( 2001 , p.
      add - notemp
  58. suppositional
  59. troublemaking
  60. truthmakers
  61. truthmaking
  62. unclosed
    • 2008 April 19, C. S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan, “Backwards explanation”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9228-y: 
      And there is the problem that in explaining the activation of the pimpernel’s function (to distinguish it from plenty of unclosed pimpernels with that function not being activated), we might need to mention the fact that it is about to rain.
      add - notemp
  63. universalist
  64. unmysterious
  65. worldmaking
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      We have a problem about consistency if the worldmaking language speaks both of local and global matters, both of particles and donkeys.
      add - notemp
  66. worldmates
    • 2008 April 25, Mark Heller, “The Donkey Problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9227-z: 
      for any two possible objects, x and y, in the same or different possible worlds, and for any two times, t1 and t2, if : (1) x at t1 has the same base properties as does y at t2, (2) x at t1 bears the same base relations to its worldmates as does y at t2, and (3) x’s worldmates have at all times the same base properties and stand in the same base relations as do the worldmates of y, then : x persists until some time after t1 iff y persists until some time after t2.
      add - notemp

Sequestered[edit]