User:Visviva/Philosophical Studies 200808

Definition from Wiktionary, the free dictionary
Jump to: navigation, search
← Previous (2008-07) Words harvested from Philosophical Studies, 2008-08
  • List status: open
→ Next (2008-09)

This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words found in the 2008-08 issue of Philosophical Studies which did not have English entries in the English Wiktionary when this list was created.

[ see all Philosophical Studies pages ] - [ see all tracking lists ]

56396 tokens ‧ 47343 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3634 types ‧ 73 (~ 2.009%) words before cleaning ‧ 

2008-08[edit]

  1. antirealist
  2. blurredness
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      We have already seen that it is not blur, or blurredness, itself, since, the special case of photographical images and suchlike apart, this attaches not to objects themselves but only to representations of objects.
      add - notemp
  3. brutism
    • 2007 July 18, Thomas Sattig, “Identity in 4D”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9136-6: 
      Since kind-membership, according to brutism, does not rest on cross-temporal facts of identity, kinds may be assigned the function of selecting a particular I-relation in order to track temporally overlapping continuants through time.
      add - notemp
  4. coherentist
    • 2007 August 8, S. Matthew Liao, “A defense of intuitions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x: 
      In particular, they might claim that they are merely employing the methods of experimental psychology, which has been shown to be successful in psychology, or that they are just appealing to some coherentist view of epistemology.
      add - notemp
  5. coincidentalism
    • 2007 July 18, Thomas Sattig, “Identity in 4D”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9136-6: 
      The fact that three-dimensionalist coincidentalism faces problems concerning how an object’s temporal trajectory is determined did not play a central role in this paper because this fact is well known.
      add - notemp
  6. coincidents
    • 2007 July 18, Thomas Sattig, “Identity in 4D”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9136-6: 
      If distinct and coinciding objects share all of their qualitative, categorical properties at the time of coincidence, and if brute facts about kind-membership are rejected, then tracking distinct three-dimensionalist coincidents through time by relations among their instantaneous, qualitative states (see principle (C0)) will be just as impossible as tracking distinct four-dimensionalist coincidents through time by relations among their instantaneous temporal parts.
      add - notemp
  7. coinflipping
    • 2007 August 8, S. Matthew Liao, “A defense of intuitions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x: 
      As we have seen, in SAW’s and WNS’s studies, they included a case, what SAW called the Coinflip Case, and what WNS called the Special Feeling Case, involving Dave and coinflipping.
      add - notemp
  8. combinatorialism
  9. commonalities
  10. continuant
    • 2007 July 18, Thomas Sattig, “Identity in 4D”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9136-6: 
      As a further point of clarification, notice that (C0) does not characterize a criterion for determining whether a continuant x of kind K that exists at t 1 is identical to a continuant y of kind K that exists at t 2 .
      add - notemp
  11. continuants
    • 2007 July 18, Thomas Sattig, “Identity in 4D”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9136-6: 
      The reason for this open formulation is simply that we want a criterion of diachronic identity to determine all facts of diachronic identity and distinctness, not just facts involving continuants of the same kind.
      add - notemp
  12. counterpossibles
  13. covariation
    • 2007 July 18, Thomas Sattig, “Identity in 4D”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9136-6: 
      This construal of the function of an informative criterion of diachronic identity is epistemic; the specified covariation allows, in principle, the tracking of a continuant through time.
      add - notemp
  14. covary
    • 2007 July 18, Thomas Sattig, “Identity in 4D”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9136-6: 
      An answer to this question is a criterion of identity over time—a criterion of diachronic identity—for Ks. More specifically, to say that there is an informative criterion of diachronic identity is to say that facts of diachronic identity covary with facts about continuants’ instantaneous qualitative profiles as well as cross-temporal relations between these profiles.
      add - notemp
  15. criticisable
    • 2007 August 23, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, “Against essential normativity of the mental”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9141-9: 
      Similarly, when I believe that p and that q follows from p , my potential belief that not- q is criticisable exactly because it is of the nature of the beliefs I have that they make believing not- q criticisable.
      add - notemp
  16. descriptional
    • 2007 July 10, Ilhan Inan, “Rigid general terms and essential predicates”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9138-4: 
      Now what worries these authors is of course that the term ‘bachelor’ seems to have a descriptional content, so if we take it to be a rigid designator, then it would seem to follow that any descriptional general term could be used rigidly.
      add - notemp
  17. designatum
    • 2007 July 10, Ilhan Inan, “Rigid general terms and essential predicates”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9138-4: 
      I am inclined to hold that if there is a plurality of objects that fall under the designatum of a term, then that should be sufficient (though not necessary) to conclude that that is a general term, even when it has a singular occurrence in a sentence.
      add - notemp
  18. disjunctivist
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      In the same year that saw the appearance of Harman’s influential article, Paul Snowdon presented an account of his disjunctivist theory of perception—a theory that is incompatible with representationalism by virtue of regarding perceived objects as constituents of perceptual experiences—in which he states that his position “is in line with a thought traditionally expressed in the words ‘experience is invisible or translucent’ [he clearly means transparent].
      add - notemp
  19. dispositionalist
  20. emergentism
  21. experimentalism
  22. externalist
    • 2007 August 8, S. Matthew Liao, “A defense of intuitions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x: 
      22 These are cases designed to explore externalist/internalist dimensions of the subjects’ intuitions—where internalism, with respect to some epistemically evaluative property, holds that only factors within an agent’s introspective grasp can be relevant to whether the agent’s beliefs have that property; and where other factors beyond the scope of introspection such as the reliability of the psychological mechanisms that actually produced the belief are epistemically external to the agent.
      add - notemp
  23. fallaciousness
  24. finkish
    • 2007 September 29, Toby Handfield and Alexander Bird, “Dispositions, rules, and finks”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9148-2: 
      But for this possibility to be confirmed as actual it must be shown that the problematic cases alluded to can indeed be accounted for as finkish or antidote cases.
      add - notemp
  25. finkishly
  26. finkishness
  27. hesistancy
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      23 On the present proposal, however, the sort of hesistancy that we find with blurred vision should not enter the picture, save as a learned response.
      add - notemp
  28. illusorily
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      Moreover, the preceding characterisation of blur applies to a case where, without any blur, an object is illusorily misperceived as being fuzzy, or fuzzier than it actually is.
      add - notemp
  29. indissociable
  30. interdefinable
  31. internalism
    • 2007 August 8, S. Matthew Liao, “A defense of intuitions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x: 
      22 These are cases designed to explore externalist/internalist dimensions of the subjects’ intuitions—where internalism, with respect to some epistemically evaluative property, holds that only factors within an agent’s introspective grasp can be relevant to whether the agent’s beliefs have that property; and where other factors beyond the scope of introspection such as the reliability of the psychological mechanisms that actually produced the belief are epistemically external to the agent.
      add - notemp
  32. internalist
    • 2007 August 8, S. Matthew Liao, “A defense of intuitions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x: 
      22 These are cases designed to explore externalist/internalist dimensions of the subjects’ intuitions—where internalism, with respect to some epistemically evaluative property, holds that only factors within an agent’s introspective grasp can be relevant to whether the agent’s beliefs have that property; and where other factors beyond the scope of introspection such as the reliability of the psychological mechanisms that actually produced the belief are epistemically external to the agent.
      add - notemp
  33. interpretability
    • 2007 August 8, S. Matthew Liao, “A defense of intuitions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x: 
      Without such a case, Sosa’s concerns that the subjects may have imported different assumptions that are not explicit in the survey, and that the subjects may just be having verbal disagreements, would surface and would seriously undermine the interpretability of WNS’s and SAW’s studies.
      add - notemp
  34. introspectionist
  35. intuitionistically
  36. kindhood
  37. mereological
  38. misperceive
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      On this proposal, actual cases of blurred vision surprisingly emerge as cases of illusion: we simply misperceive an object that lacks the B-feature as possessing it.
      add - notemp
  39. misperceived
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      When a sharp object is misperceived as having an indistinct boundary, we have a case of misrepresentation; as Tye puts it, the experience “comments inaccurately” on the object.
      add - notemp
  40. multivocality
  41. nonactual
  42. nonreductive
  43. normativist
    • 2007 August 23, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, “Against essential normativity of the mental”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9141-9: 
      So a possible explanation for the normativist would be to claim that when we ascribe normative mental properties, we do this on the basis of the non-mental, and hence non-normative properties, that mental properties are supposed to supervene on.
      add - notemp
  44. normativists
  45. ostension
    • 2007 July 10, Ilhan Inan, “Rigid general terms and essential predicates”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9138-4: 
      Furthermore, just as in the case of proper names, it accounts for the fact that when a general term is introduced by a description (and not by ostension), the newly introduced term will not automatically become synonymous with that description.
      add - notemp
  46. parafoveal
  47. perspectival
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      After all, sense-data are typically introduced into a theory as a result of argument—as a result, for instance, of reflecting on such phenomena as illusion, hallucination, perspectival variation, and so forth—and not as a result of sheer self-awareness.
      add - notemp
  48. photographical
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      We have already seen that it is not blur, or blurredness, itself, since, the special case of photographical images and suchlike apart, this attaches not to objects themselves but only to representations of objects.
      add - notemp
  49. plastically
  50. possibilia
  51. projectability
  52. projectable
  53. quus
    • 2007 September 29, Toby Handfield and Alexander Bird, “Dispositions, rules, and finks”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9148-2: 
      Van is a subject who intends by the term ‘plus’ something rather different, a bent addition function, quus, which may be explained thus: x quus y = x plus y when x and y are both less than 57, and 5 otherwise.
      add - notemp
  54. realizers
  55. reducibility
  56. representationalism
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      If it does, blur will, for reasons we are about to see, fail to be determined by representational content; in which case representationalism itself will be in deep trouble.
      add - notemp
  57. representationalist
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      The major weakness with any such representationalist account of blur, however, even with one that would escape such criticism, is that it simply does not address the challenge posed by blur to the Transparency Thesis.
      add - notemp
  58. representationalists
    • 2007 July 12, A. D. Smith, “Translucent experiences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9137-5: 
      Indeed, in dropping the Object-Determination Thesis, representationalists will be dropping the Transparency Thesis itself as well, since the only reason to drop the former is the recognition that there are features of experience—and hence, for an representationalist, aspects of representational content—that do not appear in consciousness as apparent features of the ostensible objects of experience.
      add - notemp
  59. rigidifiers
  60. rigidifies
  61. rigidifying
    • 2007 July 10, Ilhan Inan, “Rigid general terms and essential predicates”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9138-4: 
      14 Once we come to recognize these rigidifying syntactic tools we use, we will be in a better position to eliminate the fears of Devitt and others who think that any account of rigidity for general terms based on abstract entities makes too many terms rigid.
      add - notemp
  62. semantical
  63. sortal
  64. standardly
  65. strikings
    • 2007 September 29, Toby Handfield and Alexander Bird, “Dispositions, rules, and finks”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9148-2: 
      The problem is not, however, one simply of an infinite variety of possible stimuli and manifestations, for a fragile vase may break in infinitely many slightly different ways in response to infinitely many slightly different strikings.
      add - notemp
  66. subpersonal
  67. supervenience
  68. undetached
    • 2007 July 18, Thomas Sattig, “Identity in 4D”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9136-6: 
      In what follows I shall argue that temporal overlap, and hence the four-dimensionalist take on fission, constitution and undetached parts, is incompatible with any four-dimensionalist criteria of identity over time.
      add - notemp
  69. univocality
  70. unmysterious
    • 2007 July 18, Thomas Sattig, “Identity in 4D”, Philosophical Studies, volume 140, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9136-6: 
      What seems puzzling at first, is at bottom as unmysterious as co-location by sharing a spatial part, such as the co-location of a road and its sub-segments.
      add - notemp
  71. unprojectable

Sequestered[edit]