User:Visviva/Philosophical Studies 200810

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This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words found in the 2008-10 issue of Philosophical Studies which did not have English entries in the English Wiktionary when this list was created.

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42526 tokens ‧ 35915 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3123 types ‧ 78 (~ 2.498%) words before cleaning ‧ 

2008-10[edit]

  1. abstracta
  2. adverbialism
  3. adverbialist
    • 2008 August 5, Uriah Kriegel, “The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7: 
      The natural move for the adverbialist to make is to propose the following distinguishable renderings: “I am thinking green-dragon-wise and purple-butterfly-wise” for the former and “I am thinking purple-dragon-wise and green-butterfly-wise” for the latter.
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  4. cognizer
  5. concreta
  6. conventionalism
    • 2008 August 12, Luca Moretti, “The ontological status of minimal entities”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9265-6: 
      The problem with this suggestion is that it is not absurd to think that the necessity of the sentences describing the nature of a given entity, or of entities of a given type, could be merely conventional in the very same way even if this nature were knowable a posteriori (for a good defence of a form of a posteriori conventionalism of this sort see Sidelle 1989 ).
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  7. conventionalist
  8. counterfactually
  9. counterpossible
  10. denumerably
  11. determinately
  12. disjunctivists
  13. disjuncts
    • 2008 August 9, Berit Brogaard, “Inscrutability and ontological commitment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9261-x: 
      Arguably, we can claim some basic understanding of these terms, given our encounter with them in ordinary language (the truth-values of the disjuncts of a disjunction are prior to the truth-value of the disjunction, etc.
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  14. dispensability
    • 2008 August 9, Luca Moretti and Huw Price, “Introduction”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9259-4: 
      Uriah Kriegel’s ‘The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects’ makes a case against our commitment to merely intentional objects.
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  15. disquotational
    • 2008 August 6, Amie L. Thomasson, “Existence questions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9263-8: 
      The history of philosophical attempts to discover necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of various central terms is a history of failures, and often the most that can be agreed on is the uninformative disquotational claim, e. g. ‘dog’ applies if and only if there’s a dog.
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  16. dragonesque
  17. eliminativism
  18. eliminativist
  19. extensionalist
    • 2008 August 5, Michaelis Michael, “Implicit ontological commitment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9262-9: 
      A particular view of ontological commitment shall be argued for which fits that general strategy though differs significantly from the extensionalist story Quine otherwise sought to establish.
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  20. extensionalists
  21. externalist
  22. falliblist
  23. fictionalism
    • 2008 August 5, Uriah Kriegel, “The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7: 
      Thus, a philosopher unimpressed by Platonist defenses of mathematical entities, but who agreed that merely intentional objects were mental concreta, would end up with the view that numbers are mental concreta; someone impressed by eliminativist arguments about events, but who thought that merely intentional objects were abstracta, would be saddled with the view that events were abstracta; a sympathizer of moral fictionalism who held that merely intentional objects must be construed as non-existent concreta, would be landed with the view that moral values were non-existent concreta; and so on and so forth.
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  24. fundamentality
  25. gavagai
  26. hallucinatum
  27. holist
  28. hyperintensional
  29. idealisations
  30. inferentialist
  31. inferentially
    • 2008 August 9, Berit Brogaard, “Inscrutability and ontological commitment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9261-x: 
      If the quantifiers are interpreted substitutionally (or inferentially), then the inference is valid, but no ontological commitment arises in going from ‘the number of moons of Jupiter is four’ to ‘there is a number that is the number of moons of Jupiter’.
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  32. intensionally
    • 2008 August 13, Jonathan Schaffer, “Truthmaker commitments”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y: 
      Indeed the whole point of Aristotle’s example of truth depending on being was that the truth of the proposition and the existence of the man are intensionally equivalent, yet there is an asymmetry of dependence.
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  33. kangaroohood
    • 2008 August 9, Luca Moretti and Huw Price, “Introduction”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9259-4: 
      On this criterion, the theory asserting that there are kangaroos may thus turn out to be committed to the property of kangaroohood, if properties are included among the truthmakers.
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  34. mereological
    • 2008 August 13, Jonathan Schaffer, “Truthmaker commitments”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y: 
      I think that theories like mereological nihilism are interesting in the way that epistemological skepticism is interesting, the main question for both being how do we avoid this ?
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  35. misrender
    • 2008 August 13, Jonathan Schaffer, “Truthmaker commitments”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y: 
      As a result of continuing to misrender the dependency of truth on being, the TSup theorist still suffers from the first two of the four general objections leveled against TNec in Sect.
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  36. misrendering
  37. necessitarian
    • 2008 August 5, Michaelis Michael, “Implicit ontological commitment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9262-9: 
      If we consider someone, such as David Lewis, who is both a materialist and a modal realist there seems to be an asymmetry between these two arguments which a straightforwardly necessitarian view seems not to capture.
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  38. necessitations
    • 2008 August 5, Michaelis Michael, “Implicit ontological commitment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9262-9: 
      The crucial thing against the necessitation account is that there are necessitations which in no way impugn the rationality of the agent who assents to the premises of the necessitation and denies the conclusion.
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  39. nominalistic
    • 2008 August 13, Jonathan Schaffer, “Truthmaker commitments”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y: 
      If we also maintain the classical association of first-order individuals with objects , then the focus on the subject term yields a nominalistic bias against properties.
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  40. nomologically
    • 2008 August 5, Uriah Kriegel, “The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7: 
      In other words, although the term is sometimes used so that x is an intentional object iff there is a y , such that y is an intentional act and x is that which y is of or about, it is also sometimes used so that x is an intentional object iff possibly , there is a y , such that y is an intentional act and x is that which y is of or about, where the modal operator is construed either metaphysically or nomologically, depending on one’s conception of the modality involved in potentiality.
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  41. objectless
  42. objectual
    • 2008 August 9, Berit Brogaard, “Inscrutability and ontological commitment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9261-x: 
      At best, we have made progress towards determining what really exists only on the further assumption that the quantifiers in our theories are objectual (and that the function of all apparently referential terms is to refer).
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  43. objectually
  44. observability
    • 2008 August 9, Luca Moretti and Huw Price, “Introduction”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9259-4: 
      For instance, the appropriate way to address existential questions would be to apply criteria of ontological commitment to our epistemically best theories, or to appeal to general criteria of existence (such as mind-independence, observability, the Eleatic principle, etc.
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  45. ontoids
  46. ontologists
    • 2008 August 12, Luca Moretti, “The ontological status of minimal entities”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9265-6: 
      On the other hand, nominalists and parsimonious ontologists who do not believe in the existence of properties, facts and abstract entities do stick to these colloquial usages of ‘property’ and ‘fact’ grounded in principles as platitudinous as [i]–[iii] without apparent problems.
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  47. ostended
    • 2008 August 6, Amie L. Thomasson, “Existence questions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9263-8: 
      Instead, speakers may learn to master the rules of use for those terms by other means, e. g. , ostensively as we learn that a term is to be applied in situations like this (and not in situations like that ), or via judgments of similarity to ostended paradigms — where this does not require saying ‘*K* applies if and only if Ks exist’, or even appealing to the existence of other entities (as in ‘*K* applies if Js exist and…’).
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  48. ostensively
    • 2008 August 6, Amie L. Thomasson, “Existence questions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9263-8: 
      Instead, speakers may learn to master the rules of use for those terms by other means, e. g. , ostensively as we learn that a term is to be applied in situations like this (and not in situations like that ), or via judgments of similarity to ostended paradigms — where this does not require saying ‘*K* applies if and only if Ks exist’, or even appealing to the existence of other entities (as in ‘*K* applies if Js exist and…’).
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  49. overcommitment
  50. permutated
  51. phenomenalist
  52. phenomenalists
    • 2008 August 5, Michaelis Michael, “Implicit ontological commitment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9262-9: 
      However phenomenalists add that for these forests to exist all that is required is that had anyone been around to look they would have seen forests, that these forests are no more than the permanent possibility of perception.
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  53. pleonastically
  54. possibilia
    • 2008 August 6, Amie L. Thomasson, “Existence questions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9263-8: 
      Little agreement, of course, has been found on these issues—instead, we have had an increasing variety of surprising answers to the question “What is there”, ranging from those who grant existence even to possibilia or fictional characters, to those who would deny that there are any composite material objects.
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  55. referentially
  56. refigured
  57. refiguring
  58. regimentations
    • 2008 August 5, Michaelis Michael, “Implicit ontological commitment”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9262-9: 
      Quine himself seems to have vacillated on the issue, but late in his career he seemed to have decided that the matter of ontological commitment arises only for various regimentations of natural language theories (see Quine 1992 , a view he expresses more tentatively in Quine 1961 ).
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  59. revisionary
  60. semantical
  61. sortal
    • 2008 August 6, Amie L. Thomasson, “Existence questions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9263-8: 
      If (as seems more likely) ‘object’ is used as a covering term guaranteed to apply if some first-order sortal does, then we cannot deny that there is, e. g. , a table, symphony, or proposition in a given situation on grounds that there is no object; instead we can only answer the question ‘is there some object’ via answering the various sortal-specific existence questions.
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  62. standardly
    • 2008 August 6, Amie L. Thomasson, “Existence questions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9263-8: 
      I won’t discuss these options in detail here, though I have argued at length elsewhere ( 2003 , 2007a ) that artefacts (to name but one case) violate these criteria, although the application conditions standardly associated with the term ‘artefact’ are nonetheless met in spades.
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  63. stateable
    • 2008 August 6, Amie L. Thomasson, “Existence questions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9263-8: 
      Most importantly, however, for a term to have application conditions does not require that those conditions be stateable at all.
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  64. supervenience
  65. tokening
  66. trackability
    • 2008 August 6, Amie L. Thomasson, “Existence questions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9263-8: 
      So again if we attend to the established application conditions for common-sense terms like ‘story’ or ‘symphony’, it follows that these terms refer and so (given schema (E)) that stories, symphonies and the like exist, despite their apparent violation of the Eleatic criterion (as well as the mind-independence criterion, and presumably the trackability criterion as well).
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  67. trivialism
  68. truthmaker
    • 2008 August 13, Jonathan Schaffer, “Truthmaker commitments”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y: 
      But now it emerges that truthmaker commitments are parasitic upon quantifier commitments, and so the truthmaker view cannot possibly replace the quantifier view.
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  69. truthmaking
  70. undetached
    • 2008 August 5, Uriah Kriegel, “The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9264-7: 
      Likewise, there should be facts of the matter (to do with inferential role or phenomenal character) that distinguish thinking rabbit-wise from thinking undetached-rabbit-parts-wise, even if it is impossible to bear a relation to rabbits without bearing it to undetached rabbit parts, the two being necessarily coextensive.
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  71. uninformatively
    • 2008 August 6, Amie L. Thomasson, “Existence questions”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9263-8: 
      But if the application conditions for basic terms can only be stated uninformatively as: *K* refers iff Ks exist, it might seem that we will still have no help addressing basic existence questions.
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  72. universalist
    • 2008 August 13, Jonathan Schaffer, “Truthmaker commitments”, Philosophical Studies, volume 141, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9260-y: 
      This idea blocks what, intuitively, is a very attractive option: that the nihilist is right about the ontology but that the universalist is right about what sentences are true.
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  73. vegemite

Sequestered[edit]