User:Visviva/Philosophical Studies 200901

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This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words found in the 2009-01 issue of Philosophical Studies which did not have English entries in the English Wiktionary when this list was created.

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Volume 142 Number 1[edit]

52230 tokens ‧ 44579 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3861 types ‧ 79 (~ 2.046%) words before cleaning ‧ 


  1. apriorism
    • 2008 November 28, Albert Casullo, “Analyzing a priori knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5: 
      84) Once we see this, “we’ll recognize that the issue isn’t one of apriorism versus empiricism, but of apriorism versus historicism, and here the interesting question is whether one can find, for logic, mathematics, or anything else, some tradition-independent warrant, something that will meet the requirements that Descartes and Frege hoped to satisfy—in short, something that will answer to the Strong conception.
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  2. apriority
  3. assertable
  4. asserter
    • 2008 December 6, Sanford C. Goldberg, “Reliabilism in philosophy”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7: 
      After all, on the prevalent and plausible assumption that assertion has an epistemic norm, it would not be very controversial to assume further that this norm will imply that an asserter S is warranted in asserting p , only if S justifiably believes p (or perhaps: only if p is justified for S 18 ).
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  5. assimilable
  6. attributor
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      However, verdicts regarding the truth of knowledge attributions diverge with respect to cases in which the agent and the attributor with audience face markedly different stakes in connection with the matter in question.
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  7. changelessness
  8. cognitions
    • 2008 November 28, Albert Casullo, “Analyzing a priori knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5: 
      Descartes, along with many other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, took it that any knowledge worthy of the name would be based on cognitions the truth of which is guaranteed (infallible), that were maximally stable, immune to ever being shown to be mistaken (incorrigible), and concerning which no reasonable doubt could be raised (indubitable).
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  9. competences
  10. contextualism
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      When the agent and the attributer-with-audience have highly similar stakes in the matter in question, then sensitive invariantism and contextualism yields parallel verdicts.
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  11. contextualists
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      According to many contextualists, the higher the stakes confronting attributor and audience, the wider the range of relevant possibilities, so that more is required in such a context to count as knowing.
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  12. correctible
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      Their methods can be understood as evolving and correctible ways of guarding against pressing ways of going wrong (considering too few cases, considering too similar a set of cases, not shielding the study from processes that would produce spurious effects, …).
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  13. correctitude
    • 2008 December 10, Robert Audi, “Reliability as a virtue”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9305-2: 
      We can, however, use the notion of correctitude to clarify the notion of a single person’s being more reliable at one time than at another, of one person’s being more reliable than another, and of everyone’s being imperfectly reliable.
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  14. correlatively
  15. creditability
    • 2008 November 29, Baron Reed, “A new argument for skepticism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9299-9: 
      But there are several reasons for thinking that there are not in fact any significant differences, with respect to creditability, between purported instances of knowledge and accidentally true beliefs.
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  16. dimensionalism
    • 2008 December 6, Sanford C. Goldberg, “Reliabilism in philosophy”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7: 
      It is easy to list the debates that remain unsettled even after we identify what is “common sense”: presentism vs. four-dimensionalism; issues in the philosophy of physics, chemistry, or biology; disagreements about meaning, reference, or content; debates about the nature and existence of mental representation, or about the proper treatment of the semantic paradoxes.
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  17. disanalogy
  18. disjunctivism
    • 2008 November 22, Richard Fumerton, “Luminous enough for a cognitive home”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9301-6: 
      One we reject disjunctivism, we will be led inexhorably to the conclusion that we have a kind of knowledge of our internal mental states that is better than our knowledge of any propositions describing the physical world.
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  19. disjunctivist
  20. disserves
  21. evidentialist
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      An evidentialist variant would require the agent be responsive to a telling evidential basis for thinking that p obtains in contrast to the alternatives.
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  22. experientially
    • 2008 November 28, Albert Casullo, “Analyzing a priori knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5: 
      It does not follow that their mathematical knowledge is not a priori unless Mill can rule out the possibility of epistemic overdetermination—i. e. , the possibility that their mathematical beliefs are justified both experientially and nonexperientially.
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  23. externalist
  24. externalistic
  25. factivity
  26. foundationalism
  27. foundationalist
  28. foundationally
  29. implicity
    • 2008 November 22, Richard Fumerton, “Luminous enough for a cognitive home”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9301-6: 
      The modality implicity referred to is presumably something like causal possibility relative to circumstance—the kind of possibility invoked in my claim that I can raise my right hand any time I want within the next five minutes, but I can’t dunk a basketball any time within the remainder of my life.
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  30. indefeasibility
    • 2008 November 28, Albert Casullo, “Analyzing a priori knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5: 
      It is misleading because indefeasibility by experience is not a feature that differentiates a priori from empirical justification; it is a feature is common to both.
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  31. inexhorably
    • 2008 November 22, Richard Fumerton, “Luminous enough for a cognitive home”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9301-6: 
      One we reject disjunctivism, we will be led inexhorably to the conclusion that we have a kind of knowledge of our internal mental states that is better than our knowledge of any propositions describing the physical world.
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  32. informationally
    • 2008 December 10, Robert Audi, “Reliability as a virtue”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9305-2: 
      In the intellectual domain, aretaic reliability is not global, but also not merely sectorial: it has at least the generality implied by being informationally open-ended.
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  33. internalism
    • 2008 November 29, Baron Reed, “A new argument for skepticism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9299-9: 
      After laying out the traditional argument for skepticism and the basic externalist reply to it, I shall construct a new argument for skepticism—one that is equally damaging to both internalism and externalism.
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  34. internalist
    • 2008 December 6, Sanford C. Goldberg, “Reliabilism in philosophy”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7: 
      For one thing, many people regard rationality as an epistemically internalist notion, whereas reliability is a paradigmatic example of an epistemically externalist notion.
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  35. invariantism
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      When the agent and the attributer-with-audience have highly similar stakes in the matter in question, then sensitive invariantism and contextualism yields parallel verdicts.
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  36. invariantist
  37. irrefutability
  38. nonactualized
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      Some nonactualized possible communities should be included among those communities whose relevant alternatives constitute the relevant union set.
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  39. nonarbitrary
    • 2008 November 22, Richard Fumerton, “Luminous enough for a cognitive home”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9301-6: 
      The reliabilist must figure out a nonarbitrary way to specifiy both the relevant process kind, reliability of which is at issue, and the relevant environment relative to which reliability is defined.
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  40. noncognitivist
    • 2008 December 6, Sanford C. Goldberg, “Reliabilism in philosophy”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7: 
      In the case of disagreements about taste, there is the option of a noncognitivist construal of the subject-matter (and the resulting error theory regarding would-be disagreements).
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  41. noncomparative
    • 2008 November 22, Richard Fumerton, “Luminous enough for a cognitive home”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9301-6: 
      But while there is a comparative use of “appears” it has always seemed to me that Chisholm ( 1957 , Chapter 4) was absolutely right in stressing that there is a noncomparative use of “appears.
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  42. nondoxastic
  43. nonexperiential
    • 2008 November 28, Albert Casullo, “Analyzing a priori knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5: 
      Within a synchronic theory of justification, (WC) holds that S’s belief that p is justified a priori iff the cognitive states and processes of S that justify the belief that p are exclusively nonexperiential.
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  44. nonexperientially
    • 2008 November 28, Albert Casullo, “Analyzing a priori knowledge”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9302-5: 
      It does not follow that their mathematical knowledge is not a priori unless Mill can rule out the possibility of epistemic overdetermination—i. e. , the possibility that their mathematical beliefs are justified both experientially and nonexperientially.
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  45. noninferential
  46. noninferentially
  47. nonmental
    • 2008 December 9, Sanford Goldberg, “Introduction”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9298-x: 
      From here he goes on to defend a version of traditional foundationalism—one that regards our knowledge of the nonmental world as invariably inferential.
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  48. nonrelational
  49. nonveridical
    • 2008 November 22, Richard Fumerton, “Luminous enough for a cognitive home”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9301-6: 
      At least that seems true if (a) there is a probability of less than 1 that our perception is veridical and greater than 0 that it is a nonveridical counterpart, and (b) there is a common experiential element to both the veridical experience and its nonveridical counterpart that can be described as seeming to see something red and round.
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  50. ostend
  51. ostension
  52. paradigmatically
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      Suppose, paradigmatically, that you and your interlocutors are members of a contemporary general scientific discipline which provides a body of results on which people with an indeterminate range of practical projects might draw while the discipline itself is not be associated with any one project in a defining or limiting way.
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  53. pivotally
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      Thus, in identifying the interests pivotally conditioning attributions of knowledge as those of the knowing (or opining) agent, sensitive invariantists must think of the semantics of the concept of knowledge as turning on interests that are curiously disconnected from the interests that would seem significant given the central point and purpose of that concept.
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  54. redly
    • 2008 November 22, Richard Fumerton, “Luminous enough for a cognitive home”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9301-6: 
      If one grants that and one grants that there must come a point at which gradual change does result in one’s no longer feeling pain, or one’s no longer being appeared to redly, then, Williamson argues, certain plausible claims about knowledge will commit us to the view that we can’t always know that we are in pain or being appeared to redly when we are.
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  55. reliabilism
  56. reliabilists
  57. satisfactoriness
    • 2008 December 10, Robert Audi, “Reliability as a virtue”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9305-2: 
      Intuitionists, moreover, might allow intuitive satisfactoriness and intuitive cogency to suffice as anchors in processes of altering criteria of practical decision and of intellectual judgment.
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  58. sectorial
    • 2008 December 10, Robert Audi, “Reliability as a virtue”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9305-2: 
      Reliability as an intellectual virtue may entail sectorial reliability in a certain range of sectors; these may be behavioral domains as well as realms of subject-matter, but even when it is broad, sectorial reliability does not entail intellectual virtue.
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  59. standardly
    • 2008 December 4, Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, “Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9303-4: 
      The reason ‘I know that p but it’s possible that not- p ’ seems wrong is that uses of ‘it’s possible that not- p ’ standardly conversationally impart that there is a significant possibility or chance that not- p and not merely the sort that accompanies all fallible knowledge.
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  60. testifiee
    • 2008 November 26, Jennifer Lackey, “Knowledge and credit”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9304-3: 
      But then the question arises: how does a testifiee, whose belief is true almost entirely because of the competence of the testifier, deserve credit for the truth of the belief that she acquires via testimony?
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  61. tollar
    • 2008 November 22, David Henderson, “Motivated contextualism”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9306-1: 
      The question is whether the attribution of knowledge in the context of many applied communities is aptly understood as like the certification of the old Slovene tollar (which would not be tendered beyond narrow borders) or instead like the certification of a Euro note—intended reasonably for wider currency.
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  62. truthmaker
    • 2008 November 22, Richard Fumerton, “Luminous enough for a cognitive home”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9301-6: 
      It is much more plausible, I would argue, to search for a kind of justification that precludes the possibility of error, and does so by including in the justification the very truthmaker for the belief.
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  63. unassertable
    • 2008 December 4, Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath, “Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9303-4: 
      In the case of the second group, the Moorean clashes, she must explain why these seem not only unassertable but even rationally unbelievable and unknowable (by the speaker or thinker) even though if strong fallibilism is true they should be very easy to know.
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  64. univocality
    • 2008 December 6, Sanford C. Goldberg, “Reliabilism in philosophy”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9300-7: 
      Here one might also add that if common sense issues in judgments having the phenomenology of intuitiveness or obviousness, the emergence of cross-cultural research on what is found intuitive or obvious suggests a good deal of variation, and so more reason to doubt the univocality of common sense.
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  65. unproblematically
    • 2008 November 22, Richard Fumerton, “Luminous enough for a cognitive home”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9301-6: 
      It should be obvious from what I said earlier that I have no interest in defending the claim that whenever one is in a paradigmatically mental state one can unproblematically access through introspection the fact that one is such a state.
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  66. unreflectively
    • 2008 November 26, Jennifer Lackey, “Knowledge and credit”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9304-3: 
      Why on earth would we say that Morris knows where the tower is when he has picked a stranger at random, and unhesitatingly (and, one assumes, unreflectively) accepted what that person said?
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  67. veridically

Sequestered[edit]