User:Visviva/Philosophical Studies 200902

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This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words found in the 2009-02 issue of Philosophical Studies which did not have English entries in the English Wiktionary when this list was created.

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52987 tokens ‧ 45155 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3839 types ‧ 66 (~ 1.719%) words before cleaning ‧ 

2009-02[edit]

  1. apriori
  2. apriorism
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      His diagnosis of why the argument fails is that it turns on a conflation of two kinds of possibility: the fallibilist about apriorism allows for the “purely epistemic” possibility that an a priori claim will come to be empirically undermined, but this purely epistemic possibility does not entail logical (or genuine) possibility—which explains why it does not obey the usual modal axioms.
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  3. apriorist
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      It is open to the apriorist as well as to the empiricist to argue for the objectivity of traditionally a priori subject matters—such as mathematics and logic—by virtue of their instrumentality to the acquisition of knowledge generally, including their role in establishing scientific claims.
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  4. apriority
  5. assertorily
    • 2007 November 27, Stefano Predelli, “Towards a semantics for biscuit conditionals”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9187-8: 
      Given that a speaker who successfully and felicitously assertorily utters a sentence S aims at representing the actual world as a world with respect to which S is evaluated as true (Searle and Vanderveken 1985 ), and given that, as pointed out in Sect.
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  6. conjuncts
    • 2008 January 25, John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett and Jennifer C. Wright, “The folk on knowing how”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9193-x: 
      Understood as counterexamples to the two conjuncts of neo-Ryleanism, these vignettes serve to lend substantial plausibility to radical intellectualism.
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  7. contextualist
    • 2007 December 25, Jay Newhard, “The Chrysippus intuition and contextual theories of truth”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9190-0: 
      For a contextualist to argue that a token truth predication is context-sensitive due to the truth predicate by appealing to the differing truth values of Z and C, while supporting the claim that Z and C differ in truth value by appealing to the context sensitivity of a token truth predication is to argue circularly.
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  8. correctability
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      I take infallibility with respect to the correctability of a priori claims to be the central issue in establishing the compatibility of a priori justification with naturalism, and I will be articulating and defending a fallibilist notion of the a priori.
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  9. criterial
  10. denumerably
  11. derivatively
  12. dispositionalism
    • 2007 December 14, Robert Pasnau, “The event of color”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9191-z: 
      My own use of this fundamental principle will be relatively modest: I am not attempting to argue for physicalism over dispositionalism or other alternatives, but only to show that if one is to be a color physicalist, one should tie colors to events.
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  13. dispositionalist
    • 2007 December 14, Robert Pasnau, “The event of color”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9191-z: 
      If those arguments must be rejected, then it seems that the advocates of enduring color should favor a dispositionalist theory.
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  14. eliminativism
  15. eliminativist
  16. eliminativistic
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      Those who are more attracted by internalistic arguments are no doubt more attracted by the eliminativistic argumentation here than those attracted by externalistic arguments.
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  17. explanatorily
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      The claim is rather that externalistically individuated mental states are explanatorily or causally relevant : the relational features of mental states are relevant because ultimately they are responsible for the internalistically individuated mental states having the role they have.
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  18. extensionally
  19. externalist
  20. externalistic
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      Those who are more attracted by internalistic arguments are no doubt more attracted by the eliminativistic argumentation here than those attracted by externalistic arguments.
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  21. externalistically
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      Those with internalistic intuitions would admit that the elimination of epistemic mental states is a trivial consequence of the rejection of all externalistically individuated mental states.
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  22. factiveness
  23. foundationalist
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      The features of the a priori that rendered it suitable for a foundationalist account of knowledge—certainty, rational irrevisability, and the link with necessary truth—have either been rejected or deemed inessential to the basic concept.
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  24. inconceivability
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      For example, if claims are allegedly justified by their self-evidence or the inconceivability of their falsehood, the worry is that their verisimilitude does not guarantee their truth (or in the case of inference rules, their seeming to be reliable doesn’t guarantee their actual reliability).
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  25. indefeasibility
  26. indexicals
  27. individualistically
    • 2008 January 8, Markos Valaris, “Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9195-8: 
      A subject who has lived all her life on Putnam’s Twin Earth (thus lacking all direct or indirect causal contact with H 2 O), for example, cannot express the same concept by her word ‘water’ as we do, even though all her individualistically specifiable dispositions may match those of a subject on Earth.
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  28. inferentialism
  29. inferentialist
  30. inferentially
    • 2008 January 8, Markos Valaris, “Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9195-8: 
      If this concept is used inferentially, then it will differ from our concept oval for the reasons outlined in §6 above: on the hypothesis that our beings’ visual system has a glitch that makes dimes appear oval to them, dimes will be schmoval, but they will still not be oval.
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  31. internalism
  32. internalist
  33. internalistic
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      Those with internalistic intuitions would admit that the elimination of epistemic mental states is a trivial consequence of the rejection of all externalistically individuated mental states.
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  34. internalistically
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      The claim is rather that externalistically individuated mental states are explanatorily or causally relevant : the relational features of mental states are relevant because ultimately they are responsible for the internalistically individuated mental states having the role they have.
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  35. inveterately
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      Quine ( 1969b ) already noted that “creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind” (p.
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  36. irrevisability
  37. mentalistic
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      So if the current argument gives more evidence for the possibility that the mentalistic paradigm is misguided it might be more prudent for a naturalist to accept this consequence than cling on to its denial.
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  38. minoritary
    • 2007 November 27, Stefano Predelli, “Towards a semantics for biscuit conditionals”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9187-8: 
      Although the foregoing paragraphs are not intended to provide a knock-down argument against Siegel’s approach, and more generally against any analysis of bif-clauses as truth-conditionally relevant, it seems at least initially legitimate to treat this minoritary position with suspicion, and to investigate the shape for a theory of biscuit conditionals grounded on the widespread assumption of those clauses’ truth-conditional idleness.
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  39. paradigmatically
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      However, reliabilist accounts of a priori knowledge are paradigmatically naturalistic, and although they are psychologistic in the sense that they locate warrant within the psychological processes and methods that generate belief, if correct, they cannot be faulted for failing to establish the objectivity of their target beliefs: a belief is apriori-justified on a reliabilist account of justification just in case it is solely the result of a process that is, in fact, reliable and is indifferent to the particulars of experiential input.
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  40. paradoxicality
  41. praxism
  42. praxist
    • 2008 January 25, John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett and Jennifer C. Wright, “The folk on knowing how”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9193-x: 
      In what follows, we present empirical research which indicates that the claim that anti-intellectualist and praxist judgments are prevalent is mistaken on both counts.
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  43. psychologistic
  44. reflectancy
    • 2007 December 14, Robert Pasnau, “The event of color”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9191-z: 
      That is, when a colored surface is illuminated by light, an event takes place on the surface, and that event is characterized by a certain SSR. Since SSRs are defined in terms of percentages of reflectancy, the property holds constant over variations in illumination, so long as there is enough light of the right sort to produce a light-emitting event.
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  45. reliabilism
  46. reliabilist
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      However, reliabilist accounts of a priori knowledge are paradigmatically naturalistic, and although they are psychologistic in the sense that they locate warrant within the psychological processes and methods that generate belief, if correct, they cannot be faulted for failing to establish the objectivity of their target beliefs: a belief is apriori-justified on a reliabilist account of justification just in case it is solely the result of a process that is, in fact, reliable and is indifferent to the particulars of experiential input.
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  47. revisability
  48. revisable
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      if one believes it possible that logic will turn out to be empirically revisable, one surely must believe it possible that logic will be empirically revised; but that is to believe logic empirically revisable, and so not a priori (p.
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  49. revisionary
    • 2007 December 14, Robert Pasnau, “The event of color”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9191-z: 
      Of course, the standard physicalist can also be revisionary about our linguistic intuitions, but here the proposed revision seems to crudely conflate two different senses—dispositional and occurrent—in which a thing can be said to be hot, sweet-sounding, or red.
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  50. semantical
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      Others have found it too difficult to give up on semantical theory of mind and have in consequence tried to construct internalistic semantics for mental representations (Fodor 1987 ; Jacob 1997 ) (the term “narrow content” was coined for referring to exactly such internalistically individuated mental representations).
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  51. specifiable
    • 2008 January 8, Markos Valaris, “Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9195-8: 
      Now, one may wonder whether any non-trivially specifiable cognitive capacities—over and above, that is, than the capacity to think thoughts involving the concept in question, and perhaps to know its homophonic satisfaction-conditions—are entailed by possession of any particular concept.
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  52. standardly
    • 2007 December 14, Robert Pasnau, “The event of color”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9191-z: 
      And what about colored glass or plastic, which is standardly what makes an incandescent light source appear to be colored?
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  53. subdoxastic
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      And to the extent we understand what an empirical justification is, we can contrast it with a non-empirical justification or a justification that is constituted by the operations of reason (or subdoxastic reasoning processes) upon previously-acquired concepts.
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  54. subjectivist
  55. subjunctively
    • 2007 November 24, Donald W. Bruckner, “In defense of adaptive preferences”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9188-7: 
      So I want my proposed standard to be interpreted subjunctively: An agent’s adaptive preference is rational provided that if she were to examine the preference, then she would endorse it upon reflection.
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  56. substantivalist
  57. tenseless
  58. tokening
  59. unargued
    • 2007 December 14, Robert Pasnau, “The event of color”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9191-z: 
      Whereas that argument depended on the unargued assumption that we ought to hold analogous views about various sensible qualities, here the crucial thought is that we ought to have a consistent story about perceptual representation.
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  60. unidentical
    • 2008 March 14, Tuomas K. Pernu, “Is knowledge a natural kind?”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9192-y: 
      Two mental states, M 1 and M 2 , are thus narrowly (type-) unidentical if and only if M 1 is a mental state about A and M 2 is a mental state about B , when A  ≠  B or A  =  B but there is no mental state about this co-referentiality.
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  61. verificationist
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      However, to the extent that the relevant distinctions between epistemic and genuine possibilities could be drawn within a verificationist framework, one should be able to articulate the fallibilist thesis that I develop below within that framework.
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  62. warranters
    • 2008 January 30, Lisa Warenski, “Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9: 
      Some philosophers have argued more broadly for a naturalistic account of a priori justification or knowledge: Louise Antony ( 2004 ), Alvin Goldman ( 1999 ), and Georges Rey ( 1998 ) defend a reliabilist account, according to which some reliable cognitive processes could be a priori warranters.
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Sequestered[edit]

  1. schmoval
    • 2008 January 8, Markos Valaris, “Two-dimensionalism and the epistemology of recognition”, Philosophical Studies, volume 142, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9195-8: 
      If this concept is used inferentially, then it will differ from our concept oval for the reasons outlined in §6 above: on the hypothesis that our beings’ visual system has a glitch that makes dimes appear oval to them, dimes will be schmoval, but they will still not be oval.
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