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This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words found in the 2009-03 issue of Philosophical Studies which did not have English entries in the English Wiktionary when this list was created.

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2009-03[edit]

Vol 143 Issue 1[edit]

48343 tokens ‧ 41653 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 4115 types ‧ 35 (~ 0.851%) words before cleaning ‧ 

  1. biobehavioral
    • 2009 January 23, Helen Longino, “Perilous thoughts: comment on van Fraassen”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9316-z, pages 25-32: 
      In this comment I clarify what I see as the lesson of van Fraassen’s reading of the theoretical and experimental history leading up to the experiments and then apply that to some contemporary epistemological issues in the biobehavioral sciences.
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  2. clinchers
  3. conditionalize
  4. connectivities
    • 2009 January 23, Helen Longino, “Perilous thoughts: comment on van Fraassen”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9316-z, pages 25-32: 
      And, as was the case with the final emulsion experiments, the model will require reliance on idealizations (for example, of nerve cells and nerve-cell connectivities) similar to Perrin’s perfectly spherical molecules.
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  5. deflationist
    • 2008 December 6, Peter Godfrey-Smith, “Models and fictions in science”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9313-2, pages 101-116: 
      Instead, modelers achieve something useful despite themselves, in the same way that a deflationist about mathematical objects thinks that mathematicians achieve useful things despite their misguided view of their subject matter.
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  6. deliberator
  7. energeticists
  8. frictionlessly
    • 2008 December 2, Arthur Fine, “Science fictions: Comment on Godfrey-Smith”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9310-5, pages 117-125: 
      While model systems themselves may not be narratives, certainly our descriptions of them are (“Imagine two point particles moving frictionlessly with instantaneous velocities …”), and the way we construct them and use them is surely a game of make-believe.
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  9. investigable
  10. likelihoodists
  11. mathematizable
  12. microworld
  13. modalizing
    • 2008 December 6, Peter Godfrey-Smith, “Models and fictions in science”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9313-2, pages 101-116: 
      This approach would take properties and patterns to be at the bottom of a collection of modalizing and fictionalizing faculties, thereby treating mathematics, fictional models, and literary works in a unified though ontologically contentious way.
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  14. nonbehavioral
    • 2009 January 23, Helen Longino, “Perilous thoughts: comment on van Fraassen”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9316-z, pages 25-32: 
      In the case of the factors in the G + E + N model of psychiatric disorders, there are reasons independent of the model to think they exist, namely that they play a role in models of nonbehavioral biological phenomena.
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  15. nonexplainers
  16. platonism
    • 2008 December 6, Peter Godfrey-Smith, “Models and fictions in science”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9313-2, pages 101-116: 
      Let us suppose for purposes of illustration that this is true, that an implicitly platonist outlook is a feature of successful mathematical practice—in Weisberg’s terms again, that platonism is the folk ontology of research mathematics.
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  17. platonist
  18. platonists
  19. postulational
  20. psychologism
    • 2008 December 6, Peter Godfrey-Smith, “Models and fictions in science”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9313-2, pages 101-116: 
      Merely invoking the idea of a fiction does not take us far, however, and an antipathy to psychologism may prevent the simplest ways of analyzing fictions being available in this case.
      add - notemp
  21. testability
    • 2008 December 2, Bas C. van Fraassen, “The perils of Perrin, in the hands of philosophers”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9319-9, pages 5-24: 
      Probably the best known addition to Dalton’s theory, to enrich it in the direction of testability, was Avogadro’s hypothesis: “The first hypothesis to present itself in this connection, and apparently even the only admissible one, is the supposition that the number of integral molecules in any gases is always the same for equal volumes, or always proportional to the volumes” ( 1811, p. 58 ).
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  22. timestep
  23. timesteps
  24. transfictional
    • 2008 December 6, Peter Godfrey-Smith, “Models and fictions in science”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9313-2, pages 101-116: 
      [T]ransfictional statements about models should be read as prefixed with a clause stating what the relevant respects of the comparison are, and this allows us to rephrase comparative sentences as comparisons between properties rather than objects…Hence, truth conditions for transfictional statements (in the context of scientific modelling) come down to truth conditions for comparative statements between properties, which are unproblematic in the current context (that is, the problems that attach to them have nothing to do with issues surrounding fictional discourse).
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  25. uninstantiated
  26. univocally
  27. unobservables
  28. unspecifiable
    • 2009 January 23, Helen Longino, “Perilous thoughts: comment on van Fraassen”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9316-z, pages 25-32: 
      The development of an account of the biological underpinnings of behavior will be like the development of the atomic theory, a mixture of experimental, observational/clinical, and theoretical work that progressively reduces the number of unspecifiable parameters.
      add - notemp
  29. wholism

Vol 143 Issue 2[edit]

56500 tokens ‧ 48929 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3585 types ‧ 53 (~ 1.478%) words before cleaning ‧ 

  1. akratic
  2. akratically
  3. ametaphysical
    • 2009 January 27, Hartry Field, “Epistemology without metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1, pages 249-290: 
      The task as I see it is to lay out how such a notion might work, and to try to argue that most of ordinary practice (though not all the practice of normative realist philosophers) could survive using just such an ametaphysical notion of justification.
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  4. betterness
  5. clearheadedly
  6. coextension
    • 2008 January 15, Kelly Trogdon, “Physicalism and sparse ontology”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9196-7, pages 147-165: 
      In particular, I would like to examine whether it is plausible to maintain that M, despite its metaphysical coextension with D, is something over and above D if monism is true.
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  7. coherentists
  8. counterinductivist
    • 2009 January 27, Hartry Field, “Epistemology without metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1, pages 249-290: 
      For on that picture, it is hard to resist the conclusion that our inductive method has no more of a “justificatory source” than does any other “self-justifying” inductive method (e.g. a counter-inductive one); and since according to that picture one is only reasonable in believing things when there is a metaphysical justification for so doing, it is hard to resist the conclusion that our inductive conclusions are no better than the conclusions of a counterinductivist.
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  9. credal
  10. debateable
  11. disjuncts
    • 2008 January 15, Kelly Trogdon, “Physicalism and sparse ontology”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9196-7, pages 147-165: 
      We can think of undergoing C-fiber firing, e.g., as a core realizer of pain, so any disjunctive property that includes this property among its disjuncts is not metaphysically coextensive with being in pain.
      add - notemp
  12. evaluativism
  13. evaluativist
    • 2009 January 27, Hartry Field, “Epistemology without metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1, pages 249-290: 
      So on a normative realist picture, there will still be norms in Gibbard’s sense, and they will play many of the same psychological roles in explaining behavior that they do in the evaluativist picture.
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  14. expressivist
  15. facilitative
  16. factualist
  17. fictionality
  18. followable
  19. fundamentality
    • 2008 January 15, Kelly Trogdon, “Physicalism and sparse ontology”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9196-7, pages 147-165: 
      Though I argued for the intrinsicality of maximally specific physical global distributional properties by appealing to their fundamentality, I, of course, do not wish to deny that there are non-global intrinsic distributional properties.
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  20. imaginability
  21. incomparabilities
    • 2009 January 27, Hartry Field, “Epistemology without metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1, pages 249-290: 
      But in any case, I see no motivation—or rather, no motivation independent of normative realism—for thinking that there is a best norm: it may well be that for each norm there is a better one, and it seems quite likely that there are ties and incomparabilities “all the way up” (i.e. that it isn’t just norms that aren’t sufficiently good that can be equally good or incomparable).
      add - notemp
  22. intender
  23. intenders
    • 2008 February 1, Mark Schroeder, “Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-008-9200-x, pages 223-248: 
      Then it would follow, presumably, from an appropriate analogue of the subjective ought test, that intenders have adequate subjective reason to do what they intend, and hence by a generalization of the transmission principle, adequate subjective reason to do what they believe to be necessary to what they intend.
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  24. locutionary
    • 2008 January 8, Graham Stevens, “Utterance at a distance”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9199-4, pages 213-221: 
      There is a significant gap between sentences under interpretations and the utterances of sentences in particular locutionary and illocutionary acts.
      add - notemp
  25. mereologies
  26. motivatable
  27. nomically
    • 2008 January 15, Kelly Trogdon, “Physicalism and sparse ontology”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9196-7, pages 147-165: 
      His first statement of the argument appeals to nomological possibility; he claims, “If pain is nomically equivalent to N, the property claimed to be wildly disjunctive and obviously nonomic, why isn’t pain itself equally heterogeneous and nonomic as a kind?”
      add - notemp
  28. nonomic
    • 2008 January 15, Kelly Trogdon, “Physicalism and sparse ontology”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9196-7, pages 147-165: 
      In response to Kim’s first statement of the argument, I do not think that if M is merely nomologically coextensive with disjunctive property D, then, since D is nonomic, M is nonomic as well.
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  29. nonomicity
    • 2008 January 15, Kelly Trogdon, “Physicalism and sparse ontology”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9196-7, pages 147-165: 
      Since M is nothing over and above D* simpliciter, it would seem that psychological generalizations inherit the nonomicity of the generalizations in which properties like D* figure, generalizations involving disjunctions of predicates expressing particular global distributional properties.
      add - notemp
  30. parthood
  31. platonism
  32. platonistically
    • 2009 January 27, Hartry Field, “Epistemology without metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1, pages 249-290: 
      38 The worry is that the same reasons that would lead us to advise against having beliefs about the happenings in a remote village in Nepal, when one has reason to think that there is no possible explanation of the reliability of those beliefs, should equally lead us to advise against having beliefs about mathematical entities platonistically construed, given that it appears that there is no possible explanation of the reliability of those beliefs.
      add - notemp
  33. projectibility
    • 2008 January 15, Kelly Trogdon, “Physicalism and sparse ontology”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9196-7, pages 147-165: 
      Unfortunately, the monist non-reductionist faces a serious and familiar problem, one you might already have guessed: the monist non-reductive physicalist also faces a problem about the projectibility of psychological predicates!
      add - notemp
  34. projectible
  35. realizer
  36. realizers
  37. revisability
    • 2009 January 27, Hartry Field, “Epistemology without metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1, pages 249-290: 
      37 One can read the empirical revisability claim in such a way as not to require a serious story, or even to require that it is genuinely possible for there to be a story that would stand up to any scrutiny: one can read it as simply requiring that we can’t now rule out with absolute certainty that there might someday be such a story.
      add - notemp
  38. strengthenings
  39. subcollection
  40. subcollections
    • 2008 February 1, Maureen Donnelly and Thomas Bittner, “Summation relations and portions of stuff”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9197-6, pages 167-185: 
      These portions of unstructured stuffs are essential bound sums (as well as essential constant sums) of subcollections of ClMol. According to (T2), each of these portions is an essential part of Clem.
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  41. subportion
    • 2008 February 1, Maureen Donnelly and Thomas Bittner, “Summation relations and portions of stuff”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9197-6, pages 167-185: 
      Constant Basis Principle for Portions of Stuff: For any portion of stuff x there is some collection Bas x (a basis of x) such that, necessarily: (i) whenever x is present, x is comprised of the members of Bas x and (ii) every subportion of x is comprised of a subcollection of Bas x whenever it is present.
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  42. subportions
  43. sumhood
    • 2008 February 1, Maureen Donnelly and Thomas Bittner, “Summation relations and portions of stuff”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9197-6, pages 167-185: 
      A secondary point is that, whether or not Barnett’s sum/rigid embodiment dichotomy works out for portions of stuff, the summation relations introduced in the previous section seem to be much more useful in our investigation of stuffs than are the sumhood properties discussed in this section.
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  44. supernaturalist
  45. supervaluationist
    • 2009 January 27, Hartry Field, “Epistemology without metaphysics”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-009-9338-1, pages 249-290: 
      It would be roughly analogous to a supervaluationist saying of a borderline case S of baldness that S must be either determinately bald or not determinately bald, on the ground that in each precise valuation S is either determinately bald or not determinately bald. †
      add - notemp
  46. suppositional
  47. temporalization
    • 2008 February 1, Maureen Donnelly and Thomas Bittner, “Summation relations and portions of stuff”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9197-6, pages 167-185: 
      But temporalization can also be introduced into a mereology through time-indexed parthood relations as in Simons ( 1987 ), or, for four-dimensionalists, through a relation that links temporally extended objects to their instantaneous temporal parts as in Sidor ( 2001 ).
      add - notemp
  48. uncontroversially
    • 2008 January 8, Graham Stevens, “Utterance at a distance”, Philosophical Studies, volume 143, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9199-4, pages 213-221: 
      The utterance of (2) can be uncontroversially positioned in the spatio-temporal location where it was recorded: the recording is a recording of the utterance.
      add - notemp
  49. unimaginability
  50. unmixing
  51. unpersuadable
  52. unrealisticness

Sequestered[edit]