User:Visviva/Philosophical Studies 200806

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This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words, lacking English entries in the English Wiktionary as of the most recent database dump, found in the 2008-06 issue of Philosophical Studies.

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59393 tokens ‧ 50171 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3949 types ‧ 65 (~ 1.646%) words before cleaning ‧ 

2008-06[edit]

  1. akratic
  2. akratically
  3. asserter
  4. assertible
  5. autoinfanticide
  6. awarenesses
  7. biconditional
  8. bivalence
  9. brutely
  10. coextensivity
    • 2007 July 17, Chris John Daly, “Fictionalism and the attitudes”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9132-x: 
      Notice that the suggested rationale for the above coextensivity claim is not given by a broadly behaviourist account of belief, but an interpretationist account of mental states.
      add - notemp
  11. cognitivism
  12. commonalities
  13. conjunctivism
  14. conjunctivist
    • 2007 July 10, Jeffrey Dunn, “The obscure act of perception”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9123-y: 
      However, just because an analysis comes out being more conjunctivist than desired, it does not mean it is thereby identical to the forms of conjunctivism that Johnston rejects.
      add - notemp
  15. conjuncts
  16. counterfactualizing
  17. derivatively
    • 2007 July 10, Jeffrey Dunn, “The obscure act of perception”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9123-y: 
      Johnston is clear that hallucination is to involve a deficient form of awareness that proceeds derivatively from that of veridical seeing: “Hallucination is a degenerate state, a failure of the visual system to function properly... having external objects and their visible features disclosed to us is the default ability that comes with having a functioning visual system.
      add - notemp
  18. disjunctivism
  19. disjunctivist
    • 2007 July 10, Jeffrey Dunn, “The obscure act of perception”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9123-y: 
      Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Johnston formulates a non-disjunctivist version of direct realism and attempts a defense of this view from the problem of hallucination.
      add - notemp
  20. disunified
  21. evidentialism
    • 2007 August 15, Dorit Ganson, “Evidentialism and pragmatic constraints on outright belief”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9133-9: 
      At issue is the tenability of evidentialism, a view that takes differences with respect to practical needs and interests to be irrelevant to epistemic assessment: if two subjects S and S′ have the same evidence for and against p, then S and S′ cannot differ with respect to whether they are epistemically justified in believing p.
      add - notemp
  22. evidentialist
  23. evidentially
    • 2007 July 10, Chrisoula Andreou, “The Newxin puzzle”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9131-y: 
      As is clear from Newcomb’s problem, causally expected utility and evidentially expected utility can pull in different directions.
      add - notemp
  24. explanatorily
  25. expressivist
    • 2007 May 26, Michael Rubin, “Sound intuitions on Moral Twin Earth”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9118-8: 
      Since cognitivism is already a commitment of SEN, I see no harm in assuming it so long as we keep in mind that one possible lesson of MTE is that the content of moral predicates is [primarily] non-cognitive or expressivist.
      add - notemp
  26. externalist
    • 2007 June 7, Kelly Becker, “Epistemic luck and the generality problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9122-z: 
      A general defense of externalism is beyond the scope of this paper, but since my main aim is to defend reliabilism—generally construed as a brand of externalism—specifically against the generality problem, I will assume an externalist framework herein.
      add - notemp
  27. externalists
    • 2007 June 7, Kelly Becker, “Epistemic luck and the generality problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9122-z: 
      In turn, this shows that externalists must be on guard not only against veritic luck, which sometimes occurs in the form of process luck (other times as world luck), but also against other cases of non-veritic process luck, all the while being permitted, qua externalists, to ignore reflective luck.
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  28. ficionalist
  29. fictionalism
    • 2007 July 17, Chris John Daly, “Fictionalism and the attitudes”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9132-x: 
      But it seems to me that modal fictionalism is also incredible: normally we do not think that there are countless theories and stories besides the ones we will ever tell, much less that they are infinitely complex and infinitely long and so that it would be humanly impossible to tell them.
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  30. fictionalisms
  31. fictionalist
    • 2007 July 17, Chris John Daly, “Fictionalism and the attitudes”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9132-x: 
      The fictionalist about S—about (say) mathematics, or modality, or ethics—claims that this is the sort of model with which we should think about the sentences of S. Here are two illustrations.
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  32. fictionalists
  33. fictonalists
  34. foundationalist
  35. inferentially
  36. internalists
    • 2007 June 7, Kelly Becker, “Epistemic luck and the generality problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9122-z: 
      Externalists think that the chicken-sexer knows, hence that reflective luck does not preclude knowledge possession, whereas internalists tend to think that the chicken-sexer’s beliefs are unjustified, hence that she does not know, indicating that for them reflective luck does preclude knowledge.
      add - notemp
  37. interpretationist
    • 2007 July 17, Chris John Daly, “Fictionalism and the attitudes”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9132-x: 
      Notice that the suggested rationale for the above coextensivity claim is not given by a broadly behaviourist account of belief, but an interpretationist account of mental states.
      add - notemp
  38. introspectable
    • 2007 July 17, Chris John Daly, “Fictionalism and the attitudes”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9132-x: 
      [The fictionalist] posits an attitude called “acceptance” [i. e. exploitation] that is supposed to be distinct from belief but to have all the salient behavioral and introspectable consequences of belief.
      add - notemp
  39. lexicalized
  40. maximizer
    • 2007 July 10, Chrisoula Andreou, “The Newxin puzzle”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9131-y: 
      Neither the maximizer of evidentially expected utility nor the constrained maximizer can be counted on to deliberate in a way that will prompt him to take one box in the Newxin case.
      add - notemp
  41. mediately
  42. modalized
  43. nominalistic
  44. nominalistically
  45. nomologically
    • 2007 May 30, Ira Kiourti, “Killing Baby Suzy”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9121-0: 
      Then, one of the things (amongst others) that would be the case if it was the case that S tried and failed to do X, is that S failed to do X. Let us say that a principle is nomologically informative if it dictates that an action is logically possible, but nomologically impossible.
      add - notemp
  46. quotational
  47. realizer
  48. reliabilism
  49. reliabilist
    • 2007 June 7, Kelly Becker, “Epistemic luck and the generality problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9122-z: 
      Eliminating veritic luck thus requires two distinct conditions that together provide the requisite belief-truth link constitutive of knowledge: first, a process reliabilist condition construed sufficiently generally to be applicable to more than one belief token, and second, a condition that typically applies to specific belief tokens.
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  50. sensings
    • 2007 July 10, Jeffrey Dunn, “The obscure act of perception”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9123-y: 
      My thesis will be that items suited to be the primary objects of hallucination are factors in common between hallucinations and corresponding veridical sensings, common factors that explain the possibility of seamless transitions from cases of hallucination to cases of veridical perception.
      add - notemp
  51. subpercepts
  52. twofoldness
  53. unexplanatory
    • 2007 July 10, Jeffrey Dunn, “The obscure act of perception”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9123-y: 
      Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Johnston formulates a non-disjunctivist version of direct realism and attempts a defense of this view from the problem of hallucination.
      add - notemp
  54. uninstantiated
    • 2007 July 10, Jeffrey Dunn, “The obscure act of perception”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9123-y: 
      What Johnston needs is for us to be aware of instantiated sensible profiles in the case of veridical seeing (as opposed to a sensible profiles as instantiated) and uninstantiated profiles in the case of hallucination.
      add - notemp
  55. unkosher
    • 2007 May 26, Michael Rubin, “Sound intuitions on Moral Twin Earth”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9118-8: 
      Nor would we find their lack of such a term more surprising upon our discovery that they have daily contact with kosher animals (e. g. , bovines and chickens) and unkosher animals (e. g. , pigs and shellfish).
      add - notemp
  56. veridically
    • 2007 July 10, Jeffrey Dunn, “The obscure act of perception”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9123-y: 
      And since this sensible profile (being a universal) has the second-order property being instantiated by a particular , it follows that I am veridically seeing a red strawberry against a green background.
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  57. veritic
  58. veritically
    • 2007 June 7, Kelly Becker, “Epistemic luck and the generality problem”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9122-z: 
      If there were several fake sparrows in the tree surrounding the real sparrow in whose direction the agent’s attention is focused—fakes the agent cannot distinguish from the real one—the agent’s true belief would be veritically lucky, an instance of world luck, because neither sensitive nor safe.
      add - notemp
  59. worlders
    • 2007 July 17, Chris John Daly, “Fictionalism and the attitudes”, Philosophical Studies, volume 139, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s11098-007-9132-x: 
      The familiar problem which Rosen raises is the fact that Lewisian worlds (if they exist) are not spatio-temporally related to us actual worlders, and so they are causally isolated from us.
      add - notemp

Sequestered[edit]