1974, in Vivarium, volumes 12–16, E. J. Brill (publisher), page 110:
However, in continuing his exposition, Socrates describes this something else that somebody comes to know (kai heteron ennoêsêi, 73 C 7–8) as an ennoia (C 9); well, this ennoia is, again, the concept correctly framed of the Transcendent Form.
1986, Lambertus Marie de Rijk, Plato’s Sophist: A Philosophical Commentary, North Holland Publishing Company, page 65:
The same holds good for all those passages where Plato is using the word ‘ennoia’ in order to indicate the notions considered in as far as they are stamped on the memory.
1988, Margaret Sayers Peden (translator), Octavio Paz (author), Sor Juana, or, The Traps of Faith, Harvard University Press, →ISBN, page 170:
No less surprising is the fact that Sor Juana — here in agreement with the gnostics and heretics — attributes a gender to Mind, and the female gender at that. And, in fact, like sophia (wisdom), the words ennoia and epinoia, frequently used by gnostics and meaning “thought” or “idea,” are feminine. […] The gnostic sees the world in pairs, all of them derived from a dualist principle: nous (mind, spirit) and epinoia or ennoia (thought).
1990, Robert McQueen Grant, Jesus After the Gospels: The Christ of the Second Century, Westminster/John Knox Press, →ISBN, page 111:
Mind, he said, is the ruling element (principale = hēgemonikon), the first principle and source of all intellectual activity, and ennoia is a particular movement proceeding from it and related to a determinate object.
The Bahir, on the other hand, wavers between two conceptions: the one saw the maḥshabah, just like the speculations of the ancient Gnostics on the ennoia, as the highest of all the sefiroth or aeons; the other conflated it, as here, with the seventh, which remains rather enigmatic. In other passages of the Bahir, in sections 48 and 84, it is the Holy Temple of the celestial Jerusalem that is conceived as the symbol of the highest sefirah, represented by the letter ʾalef as the beginning of all letters. The logic of the Yeṣirah passage, which served as the point of departure, would suggest, in fact, the seventh place in its system of enumeration; the logic of the mystical symbolism of the ennoia, which was apparently introduced from another source, points to the first.
1992, in The Journal of Narrative Technique, volume 22, Eastern Michigan University Press:
page 4: I propose to resolve the notion of “text” into (at least) two significant components:¹⁷ the muthos,¹⁸ which may be found readily in the text, and what I shall term ennoia,¹⁹ the audience’s apprehension of the muthos, particularly its meaning. Furthermore, the rhetorical event in which the auidence appropriates the text (in its aspects of muthos and ennoia) involves a number of steps.
page 5: Step 3 is a cognitive act of evaluation on the part of the audience: they form an ennoia, a notion of what the muthos means to them. This will be highly subjective, and distinct from an apprehension of the more formal elements of the muthos that are patent in the text. The latter would include a raw list of the events comprising the sjužet; details of setting; and the like.
1992, Brian P. Copenhaver, Hermetica: The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a new English translation with notes and introduction, Cambridge University Press (2002), →ISBN, page 96:
Ennoias, the first word of this phrase, points immediately to the problem of translating the Hermetic vocabulary of perception, cognition and intuition; especially problematic is the large family of words cognate with the noun nous or “mind”: e.g., noeō, noēma, noēsis, noētos, ennoia, dianoia, pronoia, etc.; and with the noun gnōsis or “knowledge”: e.g., gignōskō, gnōrizō, prognōsis, diagnōsis, etc. The first section of the first discourse, for example, contains four of these words: “thought” (ennoias), “thinking” (dianoias), “know” (gnōnai) and “understanding” (noēsas). To the materialist Stoics, who influenced Middle Platonists such as Antiochus of Ascalon, ennoia meant a concept derived from sensation, but to other contemporaries of the Hermetic writers, the Valentinian Gnostics, Ennoia was an hypostasis, one member of the first pair (suzugia) of thirty Aeons. The Hermetica treat ennoia as an abstraction, though not in the sense of Stoicism.
Signs can refer directly to an element from reality, words like diánoia “thought, intention”, and énnoia “reflection, notion, conception”; hence: “sense of a word”, add a psychological or intentional level: a word is the vehicle of a ‘thought’, either of a speaker, or in the abstract. The ‘thought’ of the word is its meaning. Diánoia and énnoia are related to the Greek word for “mind”, noũs (itself used as “meaning” in Dionysius Thrax, Tekhnē 6.8).
This is indeed a case where the Skeptic has an ennoia in common with his opponents, which makes him competent to examine and challenge the dogmatic positions, some of them affirming and some denying that the object of this ennoia exists.¹³
As already noted, ‘conception’ is used as the translation of both epinoia (21, 42) and ennoia (20, 22). Ennoia is Stoic terminology for generic impressions whose contents are universal concepts (ennoēmata), such as man, horse, or white (Aetius 4. 11. 1–4 (= LS 39E), Plut. Comm. not. 1084F–1085B). The Stoics define a ‘preconception’ (prolēpsis) as a ‘conception’ which is acquired naturally, rather than by training (Aetius, loc. cit.); the acquisition of this class of ‘conceptions’ is a key part of the normal development of the human mind. Though the Epicureans do not use ennoia in the same technical way, their usage of prolēpsis is the same — indeed, Epicurus was the originator of this usage (DL X. 31, 33, 37). Sextus regularly uses epinoia interchangeably with ennoia (e.g. M VIII. 332a–336a), and this usage, too, may be Stoic in origin; epinoia is defined by [Galen], in a context containing many Stoic echoes (Def. med. 19. 381K (= SVF II. 89) ), as a ‘stored notion’ (enapokeimenē noēsis), which is also the definition Plutarch (loc. cit.) attributes to the Stoics for ennoia (cf. DL X. 33 for the same phrase in connection with prolēpsis).
2002: John Inglis [ed.], Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: In Islam, Judaism and Christianity, page 95 (Routledge; →ISBN
Proclus does concede that we have another sort of measurement of Time, in our marking of the passage of Time. But the sort of measuring which we do, and which we normally consider to be Time in the primary sense, is performed with a certain notion (ennoia) which is only “about” Time and is not Time itself (touta gar hê ennoia drâi hê peri chronou kai ouk autos ho chronos) (Proclus, In Timaeum III.20.02–03). If Time is to be the measure of our motion, it certainly could not be an ennoia which is in us.
In the Gnostic perspective the Archons are not only mind parasites — delusional nodes in the human mind, considered as quasi-autonomous psychic entities, if you will — they are cosmic imposters, parasites who pose as gods. But they lack the primary divine factor of ennoia, “intentionality,” “creative will.” […] The Archons approach Abraham with a fake deal, promising him possession and domination of the terrestrial realm, but this is not compatible with Sophia’s ennoia, her divine intention. The earth is not a territorial prize but a precious setting where the human species can realize its innate genius, its capacity of novelty, acting within the natural boundaries set by the Goddess. The Archons mimic the divine ennoia, Sophia’s intention, and at the same time they invert it.