Talk:Cartesian

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Latest comment: 17 years ago by Dbfirs
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I've never heard of a Cartesian well, and I don't think René Descartes would have involved himself with anything so practical. He was a mathematician and philosopher, not a hydrological engineer! Should we leave the link to clarify a common misconception, or delete it as an error which no-one would make? Dbfirs 00:17, 22 March 2007 (UTC)Reply

A quick look at b.g.c. suggests Cartesian well is a real word, with multiple senses. I'm glad you pointed this word out, it looks very interesting and a very good candidate for some research :-) By the way, I've read some Descartes, and he had a practical bent to him as well. It's a long time ago, but I remember he was talking about dissecting animals and the resulting anatomical discoveries, and so forth. Interesting guy, let's invite him as an editor!!! ;-D Language Lover 01:18, 22 March 2007 (UTC)Reply
Thanks, I realised later that I have met the term "Cartesian well" as a particular solution to Schrodinger's wave equation in a course on Quantum Mechanics many, many years ago, but I cannot remember the definition. I will have to visit a good library. There also seems to be a philosophical derivative, probably last century, but long after Descartes. I must admit that I know only of Descartes' mathematical work. I must read up on his philosophy! As you say, an interesting guy!Dbfirs 19:31, 28 March 2007 (UTC)Reply

The hypernymous Descartean brain[edit]

René Descartes shifted the center of thought and emotion from brain to soul, but never realized that this shift doesn't impact the hypernym of the thinking and experiencing organ. Whatever we philosophically decide, it doesn't affect the mechanism of thought and experiencing. The mechanism of thought has to be analyzed via information theory. That way we can prove that: 1. thought and emotions are not arbitrary but exhibit patterns, 2. the eternity of personhood is a fallacy because the informational components of personhood aren't metalogically self-causal nor cosmogonic.