# User:Visviva/Erkenntnis 200807

 ← Previous (2008-05) Words harvested from Erkenntnis, 2008-07 List status: open → Next (2008-09) This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words, lacking English entries in the English Wiktionary as of the most recent database dump, found in the 2008-07 issue of Erkenntnis. More info... Please create these entries if you are able. Feel free to maintain and annotate the list as well. Typos and non-English words can be removed, or sequestered at the bottom of the list if annotation is needed. The quotes often provide good usage examples and attestation evidence and, in many cases, should be included in the entry or citation page for the lemma. Clicking an "add" link should preload the edit form with a dummy entry including a formatted citation for the passage in question. In some cases a "notemp" link is also provided; this generates a template-free version. False blue links (entries that exist but lack a section for the appropriate language) are marked with a "*".

## Contents

40199 tokens ‧ 33572 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3634 types ‧ 58 (~ 1.596%) words before cleaning ‧

## 2008-07

1. alethiological
• 2008, Robert Mößgen, “Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, Truth and Speech Acts. Studies in the Philosophy of Language (=Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 5)”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9097-3:
Contrary to Searle’s paper, the distinction between reflecting on speech-acts, by using notions like “truth” and “proposition”, and performing speech-acts is nicely brought out by Siegwart’s “Alethic acts and alethiological reflection”.
2. analysable
• 2008, Friedrich Christoph Doerge and Mark Siebel, “Gricean Communication and Transmission of Thoughts”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9099-1, pages 55-67:
In a nutshell, since (i) Davis takes all cases of Gricean communication to be analysable with the help of ‘ S communicates M to A ’, since (ii) this schema can in turn be reduced to ‘ S communicates to A that she has M ’, since (iii) the latter picks out the thought that S has M as the communicated entity, and since (iv) Davis’s account rules that this thought will flow from speaker to hearer, it follows in the end that Davis’s own account of communication supports Strong TI.
3. assertability
• 2008, Jaroslav Peregrin, “Book Reviews”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9098-2, pages 131-135:
O’Shea leads the reader through the basic argument for the rejection of the Myth of the Given to the intricate cluster of problems surrounding the relationship between the causal aspect of knowledge (including Sellars’ attempt at vindicating the idea of correspondence by transplanting it wholly into this aspect) and its normative aspect (including the explanation of truth as correct assertability).
4. centerground
• 2008, Jaroslav Peregrin, “Book Reviews”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9098-2, pages 131-135:
And with Sellars’ shift to the centerground of philosophical interest, we have, all of a sudden, two such books appearing almost contemporaneously.
5. communicationally
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The pragmatic and the subjectivist interpretation of what may count as communicationally or epistemically relevant semantic information coherently converge on the same conclusion, even if they come from different perspectives: had a known that i was actually a piece of misinformation she would not have asked q in order to obtain i in the first place.
6. completedly
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Specified Meet Contraction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9088-4, pages 31-54:
Weak conjunctive inclusion can be used in combination with conjunctive overlap to characterize those non-explosive partial meet contractions that are completedly relational:
7. conditionalization
• 2008, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
Finally, in Sect. 8 , we show that Reichenbach’s method is identical to Jeffrey conditionalization under a certain restriction.
8. connectives
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Specified Meet Contraction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9088-4, pages 31-54:
The language contains the usual truth-functional connectives: negation ${\displaystyle (\neg ),}$ conjunction (&), disjunction (∨), implication (→), and equivalence ${\displaystyle (\leftrightarrow ).\,\,\top }$ denotes an arbitrary tautology.
9. deflationism
• 2008, Robert Mößgen, “Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, Truth and Speech Acts. Studies in the Philosophy of Language (=Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 5)”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9097-3:
In “The use of force against deflationism” they argue, against several versions of deflationism, that the concept of truth must play a substantive explanatory role in an adaquate account of assertion.
10. disquotation
• 2008, Robert Mößgen, “Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, Truth and Speech Acts. Studies in the Philosophy of Language (=Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 5)”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9097-3:
In the case of (iii), disquotation changes meaning.
11. emotively
• 2008, Friedrich Christoph Doerge and Mark Siebel, “Gricean Communication and Transmission of Thoughts”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9099-1, pages 55-67:
In contrast, expressing it emotively is performing an action in order to provide an indication of the emotion directly .
12. erotetically
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The idea of interpreting relevant information erotetically was already exploited by Cohen ( 1994 ).
13. formalisms
• 2008, Georg Brun, “Formalization and the Objects of Logic”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9112-3, pages 1-30:
For the philosophy of logic, the debate about propositions, sentences and so on is a key issue since it concerns the question of how we may understand the common practice of using logical formalisms in philosophy.
14. formalizations
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
Similar conclusions may be reached regarding the logical literature, which has concentrated mainly on S-theories, providing a variety of formalizations of logics for relevance-related notions such as conditional independence, subjunctive conditionals, novelty, causal change and co-variance (also known as perturbation models).
15. foundationalism
• 2008, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
Here Reichenbach’s motivation is not to defend a frequentistic theory of probability, but to attack foundationalism in epistemology, at least in the form in which it occurs in the writings of Lewis (and also Russell).
16. foundationalists
• 2008, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
These familiar failings have tended to obscure the fact that Reichenbach also used the concept of a posit in another, and altogether more defensible context, namely in his debate with the foundationalists of his day such as Bertrand Russell and Clarence I. Lewis.
17. frequentism
• 2008, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
As he sees it, there are two major philosophical objections to frequentism (Reichenbach 1951 , pp. 236–237).
18. frequentistic
• 2008, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
Reichenbach’s main motivation for using his posits of the first kind springs from his adherence to a frequentistic theory of probability.
19. incomputable
• 2008, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
Lewis denies that an infinite sequence makes sense, for either it is incomputable or it will converge to zero.
20. inferentially
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
Of course, there are many ways in which misinformation may be indirectly, inferentially or metatheoretically relevant, yet this is not what is in question here.
21. informee
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
Yet, what is being presupposed is not some pre-formed or innate quantity of relevant information in the head of the informee, but just the presence in a of some relevance-detecting capacity, implicit in the description of a as a rational agent.
22. intensionally
• 2008, Georg Brun, “Formalization and the Objects of Logic”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9112-3, pages 1-30:
10 In Carnap’s ( 1956 , Sects. 6, 14) terminology, two utterances express the same proposition if they are L-equivalent (in contradistinction to: if they are intensionally isomorphic).
23. macrophysical
• 2008, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
B&S argue that ordinary macrophysical facts, e.g., about water, are just such counterexamples.
24. maxichoice
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Specified Meet Contraction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9088-4, pages 31-54:
2 This can be most easily seen from the maxichoice case, in which ${\displaystyle K\div p}$ is never finite-based if the language is infinite and ${\displaystyle p\in K\setminus {\hbox{Cn}}({\varnothing })}$:
25. metainformation
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
Or a may simply be assumed to be reasonable enough to ask the appropriate question to obtain i , if provided with sufficient metainformation about the availability of i .
26. metaphilosophical
• 2008, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
In essence, the issue at hand is the metaphilosophical question of whether all philosophical “analysis” involving hypothetical cases is “conceptual analysis.”
27. metatheoretical
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
In Sect. 7, some of the advantages of the metatheoretical revision are illustrated.
28. metatheoretically
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The Stalnaker-Lewis approach is far from being uncontroversial or devoid of problems, but it does allow one to avoid the circularity of having to establish what information is metatheoretically or contextually relevant to the agents in order to evaluate some further relevant information.
29. multiagent
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
No condition contains, or requires a reference to, epistemically relevant information; the Harsanyi doctrine, regarding multiagent systems, is also relevance-independent; and the logic of rational choice in general or Bayesian learning in particular does not rely on epistemic relevance.
30. nomic
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The previous reply would be entirely convincing were it not for the fact that the chemist does not stop at the successful litmus test, but actually explains its success through a well-supported theory on the nature and nomic behaviour of acids as substances that are proton donors and accept electrons to form ionic bonds.
31. nomologically
• 2008, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
Any weaker connection than logical determination leaves open the possibility that water and H 2 O are only contingently or nomologically correlated, accidentally coinciding in the actual world.
32. objectivistic
• 2008, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
In this section we propose to contribute to the general project of connecting chance and credence by showing that Reichenbach’s objectivistic approach is intimately linked to subjectivistic Jeffrey conditionalization.
33. performator
• 2008, Robert Mößgen, “Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, Truth and Speech Acts. Studies in the Philosophy of Language (=Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 5)”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9097-3:
He provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of speech-acts: “We perform illocutionary acts by uttering suitable sentences Σ, consisting of a performator Ξ and a proposition Δ.
34. physicalistically
• 2008, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
Hence, any facts that are commonly admitted as physicalistically acceptable but that don’t fit C&J’s model are counterexamples to their view.
35. pretheoretical
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
True, we encounter plenty of hints about what it might mean for some information p to be relevant, yet these normally amount to more or less implicit endorsements of a variety of commonsensical and pretheoretical understandings of the concept, which fail to provide a conceptual foundation and a shareable, explanatory frame.
36. prosentential
• 2008, Robert Mößgen, “Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, Truth and Speech Acts. Studies in the Philosophy of Language (=Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 5)”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9097-3:
ݛD]isquotationalism, minimalism, the redundancy theory, the prosentential theory, and more” (ibid.) are embraced by the term “linguistic deflationism”.
37. representability
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Specified Meet Contraction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9088-4, pages 31-54:
The first of these is concerned with the finite representability of belief sets.
38. semantical
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
And yet, the complaint may seem unfair, for no theory of information, from the most purely syntactical 2 to the most strongly semantical, 3 was ever meant to cast any light on the phenomenon of relevance.
39. statable
• 2008, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
They thereby concede that there may be no finitely statable reductive explanations.
40. subexpressions
• 2008, Robert Mößgen, “Dirk Greimann and Geo Siegwart, Truth and Speech Acts. Studies in the Philosophy of Language (=Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 5)”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9097-3:
Performing an illocutionary act, we use all subexpressions μ of the uttered sentence Σ [...]
41. subformula
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
And an inference (or in general any valid formula) is k-relevant if it contains no single occurrence of a subformula which can be replaced by its negation salva validitate ”.
42. subjectivist
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The subjectivist interpretation of epistemically relevant information is not entirely uncontroversial and has been subject to some criticisms, 24 which may be summarised into two objections.
43. subjectivistic
• 2008, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
In this section we propose to contribute to the general project of connecting chance and credence by showing that Reichenbach’s objectivistic approach is intimately linked to subjectivistic Jeffrey conditionalization.
44. superdupervenience
• 2008, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
By the argument rehearsed above, the need for superdupervenience seems in turn to require reduction of the non-physics facts about water or consciousness to strictly physics facts using only broadly logical resources, just as C&J suppose.
45. supervenience
• 2008, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
If so, then there will be facts about the supervenience relations, S-facts.
46. supraclassical
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Specified Meet Contraction”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9088-4, pages 31-54:
Furthermore, Cn is assumed to be supraclassical (if p follows from A by classical truth-functional logic, then ${\displaystyle p\in {\hbox{Cn}}(A)),}$ and to satisfy the deduction property ${\displaystyle (q\in {\hbox{Cn}}(A\cup \{p\})}$ if and only if ${\displaystyle (p\to q)\in {\hbox{Cn}}(A)).\,\,A}$ is a belief set if and only if ${\displaystyle A={\hbox{Cn}}(A).\,\,K}$ denotes a belief set.
47. systematicity
• 2008, Georg Brun, “Formalization and the Objects of Logic”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9112-3, pages 1-30:
It would of course be desirable for reasons of systematicity that one could identify some kind of entity that does all these jobs.
48. thingish
• 2008, Jaroslav Peregrin, “Book Reviews”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9098-2, pages 131-135:
(However, Sellars vehemently rejects that this would imply they are merely ‘in the eye of the beholder’—despite starting as mere posits of a theoretician, once the theory acquires a certain social status, they become as thingish as a thing can be.)
49. transcendentality
• 2008, Jaroslav Peregrin, “Book Reviews”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9098-2, pages 131-135:
One such reinterpretation of traditional terms is provided by the next chapter, devoted to explaining Sellars’ notion of the transcendentality of philosophy (including his understanding of the a priori, of the categorical structure of the world etc.)
50. truthmakers
• 2008, Peter McLaughlin, “Paul A. Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9100-z, pages 141-144:
These facts can serve as the truthmakers of the corresponding propositions.
51. uninterpreted
• 2007, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The second reply is that one might think of some cases of relevant facts or uninterpreted signals / data as being interpretable in terms of hard-wired questions, posed by the agents involved, which receive equally hard-wired answers, offered by the environment, where the latter are interpretable as affordances.