# User:Visviva/Erkenntnis 200807

 ← Previous (2008-05) Words harvested from Erkenntnis, 2008-07 List status: open → Next (2008-09) This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words found in the 2008-07 issue of Erkenntnis which did not have English entries in the English Wiktionary when this list was created. More info... Please create these entries if you are able. Feel free to maintain and annotate the list as well. Typos and non-English words can simply be removed. English words which may not qualify for inclusion for any reason can be sequestered at the bottom of the list. The quotes often provide good usage examples and attestation evidence and, in most cases, should be included in the entry or citation page for the lemma. To activate the "add" links, which simplify the addition of citations, add the following code to Special:Mypage/monobook.js, and clear your cache: importScript('User:Visviva/pretext.js');  When this is done, clicking the "add" link should preload the edit form with a dummy entry including a formatted citation for the passage in question. In some cases a "notemp" link is also provided; this generates a template-free version. In lists created since 2008-02-03, false blue links (entries that exist but lack an English section) are marked with a "*".

## Contents

40199 tokens ‧ 33572 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3634 types ‧ 58 (~ 1.596%) words before cleaning ‧

## 2008-07

1. alethiological
2. analysable
• 2008 January 17, Friedrich Christoph Doerge and Mark Siebel, “Gricean Communication and Transmission of Thoughts”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9099-1, pages 55-67:
In a nutshell, since (i) Davis takes all cases of Gricean communication to be analysable with the help of ‘ S communicates M to A ’, since (ii) this schema can in turn be reduced to ‘ S communicates to A that she has M ’, since (iii) the latter picks out the thought that S has M as the communicated entity, and since (iv) Davis’s account rules that this thought will flow from speaker to hearer, it follows in the end that Davis’s own account of communication supports Strong TI.
3. assertability
• 2008 April 3, Jaroslav Peregrin, “Book Reviews”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9098-2, pages 131-135:
O’Shea leads the reader through the basic argument for the rejection of the Myth of the Given to the intricate cluster of problems surrounding the relationship between the causal aspect of knowledge (including Sellars’ attempt at vindicating the idea of correspondence by transplanting it wholly into this aspect) and its normative aspect (including the explanation of truth as correct assertability).
4. centerground
• 2008 April 3, Jaroslav Peregrin, “Book Reviews”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9098-2, pages 131-135:
And with Sellars’ shift to the centerground of philosophical interest, we have, all of a sudden, two such books appearing almost contemporaneously.
5. communicationally
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The pragmatic and the subjectivist interpretation of what may count as communicationally or epistemically relevant semantic information coherently converge on the same conclusion, even if they come from different perspectives: had a known that i was actually a piece of misinformation she would not have asked q in order to obtain i in the first place.
6. completedly
• 2008 January 3, Sven Ove Hansson, “Specified Meet Contraction”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9088-4, pages 31-54:
Weak conjunctive inclusion can be used in combination with conjunctive overlap to characterize those non-explosive partial meet contractions that are completedly relational:
7. conditionalization
8. connectives
9. deflationism
10. disquotation
11. emotively
12. erotetically
13. formalisms
• 2008 May 14, Georg Brun, “Formalization and the Objects of Logic”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9112-3, pages 1-30:
For the philosophy of logic, the debate about propositions, sentences and so on is a key issue since it concerns the question of how we may understand the common practice of using logical formalisms in philosophy.
14. formalizations
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
Similar conclusions may be reached regarding the logical literature, which has concentrated mainly on S-theories, providing a variety of formalizations of logics for relevance-related notions such as conditional independence, subjunctive conditionals, novelty, causal change and co-variance (also known as perturbation models).
15. foundationalism
• 2008 April 4, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
Here Reichenbach’s motivation is not to defend a frequentistic theory of probability, but to attack foundationalism in epistemology, at least in the form in which it occurs in the writings of Lewis (and also Russell).
16. foundationalists
• 2008 April 4, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
These familiar failings have tended to obscure the fact that Reichenbach also used the concept of a posit in another, and altogether more defensible context, namely in his debate with the foundationalists of his day such as Bertrand Russell and Clarence I. Lewis.
17. frequentism
18. frequentistic
19. incomputable
20. inferentially
21. informee
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
Yet, what is being presupposed is not some pre-formed or innate quantity of relevant information in the head of the informee, but just the presence in a of some relevance-detecting capacity, implicit in the description of a as a rational agent.
22. intensionally
23. macrophysical
• 2008 January 23, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction” doi, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
B&S argue that ordinary macrophysical facts, e.g., about water, are just such counterexamples.
24. maxichoice
25. metainformation
26. metaphilosophical
• 2008 January 23, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction” doi, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
In essence, the issue at hand is the metaphilosophical question of whether all philosophical “analysis” involving hypothetical cases is “conceptual analysis.”
27. metatheoretical
28. metatheoretically
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The Stalnaker-Lewis approach is far from being uncontroversial or devoid of problems, but it does allow one to avoid the circularity of having to establish what information is metatheoretically or contextually relevant to the agents in order to evaluate some further relevant information.
29. multiagent
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
No condition contains, or requires a reference to, epistemically relevant information; the Harsanyi doctrine, regarding multiagent systems, is also relevance-independent; and the logic of rational choice in general or Bayesian learning in particular does not rely on epistemic relevance.
30. nomic
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The previous reply would be entirely convincing were it not for the fact that the chemist does not stop at the successful litmus test, but actually explains its success through a well-supported theory on the nature and nomic behaviour of acids as substances that are proton donors and accept electrons to form ionic bonds.
31. nomologically
• 2008 January 23, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction” doi, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
Any weaker connection than logical determination leaves open the possibility that water and H 2 O are only contingently or nomologically correlated, accidentally coinciding in the actual world.
32. objectivistic
• 2008 April 4, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
In this section we propose to contribute to the general project of connecting chance and credence by showing that Reichenbach’s objectivistic approach is intimately linked to subjectivistic Jeffrey conditionalization.
33. performator
34. physicalistically
• 2008 January 23, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction” doi, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
Hence, any facts that are commonly admitted as physicalistically acceptable but that don’t fit C&J’s model are counterexamples to their view.
35. pretheoretical
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
True, we encounter plenty of hints about what it might mean for some information p to be relevant, yet these normally amount to more or less implicit endorsements of a variety of commonsensical and pretheoretical understandings of the concept, which fail to provide a conceptual foundation and a shareable, explanatory frame.
36. prosentential
37. representability
38. semantical
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
And yet, the complaint may seem unfair, for no theory of information, from the most purely syntactical 2 to the most strongly semantical, 3 was ever meant to cast any light on the phenomenon of relevance.
39. statable
• 2008 January 23, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction” doi, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
They thereby concede that there may be no finitely statable reductive explanations.
40. subexpressions
41. subformula
42. subjectivist
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The subjectivist interpretation of epistemically relevant information is not entirely uncontroversial and has been subject to some criticisms, 24 which may be summarised into two objections.
43. subjectivistic
• 2008 April 4, David Atkinson and Jeanne Peijnenburg, “Reichenbach’s Posits Reposited”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9089-3, pages 93-108:
In this section we propose to contribute to the general project of connecting chance and credence by showing that Reichenbach’s objectivistic approach is intimately linked to subjectivistic Jeffrey conditionalization.
44. superdupervenience
• 2008 January 23, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction” doi, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
By the argument rehearsed above, the need for superdupervenience seems in turn to require reduction of the non-physics facts about water or consciousness to strictly physics facts using only broadly logical resources, just as C&J suppose.
45. supervenience
• 2008 January 23, Thomas W. Polger, “H2O, ‘Water’, and Transparent Reduction” doi, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9092-8, pages 109-130:
If so, then there will be facts about the supervenience relations, S-facts.
46. supraclassical
47. systematicity
48. thingish
• 2008 April 3, Jaroslav Peregrin, “Book Reviews”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9098-2, pages 131-135:
(However, Sellars vehemently rejects that this would imply they are merely ‘in the eye of the beholder’—despite starting as mere posits of a theoretician, once the theory acquires a certain social status, they become as thingish as a thing can be.)
49. transcendentality
• 2008 April 3, Jaroslav Peregrin, “Book Reviews”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9098-2, pages 131-135:
One such reinterpretation of traditional terms is provided by the next chapter, devoted to explaining Sellars’ notion of the transcendentality of philosophy (including his understanding of the a priori, of the categorical structure of the world etc.)
50. truthmakers
51. uninterpreted
• 2007 November 27, Luciano Floridi, “Understanding Epistemic Relevance”, Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 1, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9087-5, pages 69-92:
The second reply is that one might think of some cases of relevant facts or uninterpreted signals / data as being interpretable in terms of hard-wired questions, posed by the agents involved, which receive equally hard-wired answers, offered by the environment, where the latter are interpretable as affordances.