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This is a list of lowercase non-hyphenated single words, lacking English entries in the English Wiktionary as of the most recent database dump, found in the 2008-09 issue of Erkenntnis.
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46378 tokens ‧ 38735 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 3597 types ‧ 75 (~ 2.085%) words before cleaning ‧
2008, Michael Baumgartner, “The Causal Chain Problem”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9113-2:
- (Frydenberg 1990 ) and (Verma and Pearl 1991 ) have shown that probabilistic indistinguishability can be nicely captured in graphical terms: Two directed acyclic graphs G 1 and G 2 represent two probabilistically indistinguishable causally Markov and faithful causal structures iff (i) G 1 and G 2 have the same vertex set; (ii) G 1 and G 2 have the same adjacencies; and (iii) G 1 and G 2 have the same unshielded colliders , where an unshielded collider is constituted by two edges that collide at the same vertex and whose tails are not adjacent.
2008, Luca Incurvati, “Too Naturalist and Not Naturalist Enough: Reply to Horsten”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9114-1:
- For the arithmeticity of the axioms of PA—i. e. the claim that they can be seen as true on the basis of our basic grasp of the structure of the natural numbers—is motivated by Isaacson by appealing to the categoricity of PA 2 , the second-order theory which provides us with a categorical characterization of the natural numbers as the smallest structure closed under a one-to-one successor operation and containing an element which is not the successor of any element.
2008, Frieder Lempp, “The Logical Structure of International Trade Theory”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9110-5:
- 4 He introduced a model-theoretical characterisation of scientific theories opposing the then prevailing orthodox view of theories as deductively closed and finitely axiomatised sets of sentences.
- Rather than identifying a natural type within the sphere of mathematical knowledge, Horsten’s Conjecture says what form the statements mathematically accepted by the mathematical community take as a whole, by claiming that they form an axiomatizable theory, and giving a guess as to what that theory is.
- The chain problem might be seen to establish that coincidence data must be complemented by additional empirical information in order to allow for unambiguous inferences to chainlike structures.
2008, Peter Baumann, “Contrastivism Rather than Something Else? On the Limits of Epistemic Contrastivism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9111-4:
- In the last section I proposed to broaden contrastivism with respect to admissible kinds of third relata while in the first section I proposed to restrict it with respect to kinds of knowledge.
- Now, I am going to argue that the contrastivist should accept a further condition on the knowledge-relation, a further relativization.
2007, Sanford Goldberg, “Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9096-4:
- But I emphasize that, for an anti-individualist, the fact that such demonstratives are employed in fixing the reference no more affects the contents being thought in the water case, than they do in the case of Sid and the twins.
- Sid’s inability to tell the twins apart, however, does not preclude him from being able to determine (demonstratively or indexically) which twin he is thinking of, on any occasion on which he is determinately thinking of one of them.
- There is a principle at work here which is analogous to disquotation principles for sentences: Skip “the belief that” on the left side of “is true iff” and you get the right hand side of the bi-conditional (assuming that the meta-language contains the object-language).
- After all, she is using ‘water’ with the intention of designating a natural kind; and so if she stops to consider whether it is possible that there are in fact two natural kinds in play, both exhibiting superficially indistinguishable watery features but different as to their underlying nature, she herself would regard T1** and T2** as differentially doubtworthy.
- Second, while so construing a subject has some far-reaching consequences—it sometimes complicates the matter of determining the rationality of differential dubitability, and it suggests that a subject’s relation to her own conceptions may be more complicated than we might have supposed—the proposed construal does not ultimately introduce any troublesome gap between the subject’s cognitive perspective and how she conceives of things.
- Thus the complete framework of General Equilibrium Theory as developed, for instance, in the Arrow–Debreu model is too general as a basis of ITT. 10 Furthermore, this model endogenises properties, such as the time and place of commodities, which are crucial to ITT and should therefore be made explicit in a reconstruction of the theory.
- When we pre-theoretically or informally model the processes behind interpretations (I) and (II) we seem to implicitly draw on additional information, which apparently resolves c -equivalencies.
- To make sure that the dependencies between aggregations of economic units and their constituents are not violated, we define the extensivity constraint C ex (ITT 0 ).
2008, John E. Sarnecki, “Sortals for Dummies”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s10670-007-9094-6:
- As Xu and Carey have shown, while children may be aware of property or featural distinctions between objects, they do not use them to distinguish unique individuals (Xu and Carey 1996 ).
- 20 For instance, the proof of G ZFC formalizable in Tr(ZFC) makes use of the concept of truth, which, Horsten ( 2001 , pp. 178–179) claims, is a philosophical and not a mathematical concept.
- But if we reject this claim, then, while we can preserve the hypothesis that Schmidt is rational in adopting an attitude of differential doubt, we lose our grounds for supposing that the thought-contents she is thinking are subjectively indistinguishable to her (this supposition having been based on the subjective indiscernibility of T1 and T2 qua contents).
- Thus, while there is no unrestricted or noncontextual application of concepts like object or thing, it is nevertheless clear that there are circumstances in which the application conditions of the object concept do yield precise enumerations of objects within a given situation.
- It should be clear, however, that this is not the basic distinction between three-dimensional spatially bound objects and nonobjects that the child uses to parse his or her experience.
- It runs contrary to Piaget’s assertion ( 1954 ) that infants of this age act out of a sort of egocentric phenomenalism, in which what exists for the child only does so relative to his or her current perceptions.
- I don’t dispute that some cases of this sort—involving a subject who differentially doubts what, pretheoretically, we would take to be one and the same thought-content, entertained twice—might be best described by hypothesizing a difference in content.
- Notwithstanding this lacking specificity, given a concrete causal process and a level of specificity chosen for the analysis of that process it is normally uncontroversial which factors can be said to be proximately instantiated.
2008, Mikkel Gerken, “Is There a Simple Argument for Higher-Order Representation Theories of Awareness Consciousness?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9116-z:
- It seems plausible that the disagreement between the competing representationalist theories traces back to an underlying disagreement about the nature of mental representation.
- A theory according to which a causal connection to the representatum is a necessary condition on mental representation is a candidate which might do the job (along with S5).
- Firstly, the reconstruction provides a consistent and uniform presentation of the theory, which is more precise than most economic descriptions mixing natural language with semiformal and mathematical expressions.
- In delimiting what features of a given object or kind are relevant to determining instances of that kind, the sortalist has specified a de facto means for enumerating and recognizing its tokens.
- If it can be shown, for example, that children or infants lack the appropriate discriminative abilities––if they do not, as a matter of fact, make sortalized discriminations––then the account of concept possession above cannot be sustained.
- At the same time, because Jones has been slow-switched, the anti-individualist would standardly regard T1** and T2** as distinct thought-contents.
2008, Kevin Dewan, “Review of Heather Dyke, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 2, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9115-0:
- Those who endorse the A-theory of time, for example, often attempt to show that tense is ineliminable, i. e. , it is impossible to adequately paraphrase tensed sentences into tenseless ones.
- S4 alt : A mental state, M*, is S’s mental representation of an object, O, iff (if optimal conditions were to obtain, then M* would be tokened in S iff (O obtains and O cause M*)).
- 27 However, for the sake of the argument, let us again ignore these conceptual hurdles in order to see whether, given that clarity on the notion of a transfer process could somehow be presupposed, the chain problem could at least be solved for physical processes that in fact involve such transferences.
- Addressing this question is not only relevant for determining whether the empirical underdetermination of causal inferences is a matter of principle or merely a consequence of unsuitable or noisy data.
- 2000 ) the fact that empirical data often considerably underdetermines causal inferences—especially when it comes to inferences to complex causal structures—has become a widely recognized and investigated problem in the literature on (algorithmic) causal reasoning.