# User:Visviva/Erkenntnis 200811

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## Contents

56473 tokens ‧ 46537 valid lowercase tokens ‧ 4141 types ‧ 116 (~ 2.801%) words before cleaning ‧

## 2008-11

1. abelianness
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
Note that requiring ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}^{\prime }\subseteq {\mathfrak {M}}}$ is equivalent to requiring that ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}^{\prime }}$ is abelian since abelianness holds just in case ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}^{\prime }\subseteq ({\mathfrak {M}}^{\prime })^{\prime }={\mathfrak {M}}^{\prime \prime }={\mathfrak {M}}.}$
2. agenthood
• 2008, Patrick Allo, “Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9130-1:
That is, besides the usual epistemic operators which take care of agenthood, modal operator epistemology also includes temporal operators to deal with dynamic phenomena, and alethic operators to handle forcing strategies.
3. antirealist
• 2008, Holger Andreas, “Another Solution to the Problem of Theoretical Terms”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9119-9:
One may object to the present exposition of the problem of theoretical terms that it is given in an empiricist and antirealist framework, thereby suggesting to dissolve that problem by simply abandoning the framework in which it is formulated.
4. autoepistemic
• 2008, Patrick Allo, “Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9130-1:
To that end, logical epistemology is presented with an explicit reference to Hintikka’s initial autoepistemic inspiration.
5. autonymously
• 2008, Kai F. Wehmeier, “Wittgensteinian Tableaux, Identity, and Co-Denotation”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9118-x:
This confusion, however, is harmless, for it is completely resolvable by context: Individual constants occurring to the immediate left or right of a triple bar denote themselves, autonymously; in all other contexts, they denote their usual denotations.
6. bathetically
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
No wonder the cosmic question whether to call two such world systems true should simmer down, bathetically, to a question of words.
7. categoricals
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
Underdetermination does not apply to weak theories, for instance, if the number of observational categoricals implied by a theory is finite then we can, in principle, replace the original formulation with one consisting of the finite conjunction of all the implied observational categoricals and then we have a unique theory with no non-observational statements about the world—what Quine calls a tight fit.
• 2008, R. W. Fischer, “Joseph LaPorte, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9128-8:
In that case, the traditional rodents turned out to be unrelated, at least by the historical standards of cladism […].
9. classicality
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
One way to guarantee that superselection rules are present in a form that ensures classicality of macro-observables is the time honored method of theft over honest toil.
10. cognizer
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
So although McDowell takes experiences themselves to justify perceptual beliefs, this task always requires the cognizer to form beliefs or judgments about how the world appears to him (henceforth, ‘appearance beliefs’).
11. coherentist
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
The question of the epistemic liaison between sensory experience (perception) and belief has long been a controversial one dividing the foundationalist and coherentist theories of the structure of our justified beliefs.
12. commutant
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
The basic mathematical entity to be used here in elucidating the different senses of superselection rules is a von Neumann algebra ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}},}$ a concrete C * -algebra 6 of bounded linear operators acting on a Hilbert space 7 ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}}$ that is closed in the weak topology 8 or, equivalently, 9 that has the property that ${\displaystyle ({\mathfrak {M}}^{\prime })^{\prime }:={\mathfrak {M}}^{\prime \prime }={\mathfrak {M}},}$ where “′” denotes the commutant.
13. connectives
• 2008, Holger Andreas, “Another Solution to the Problem of Theoretical Terms”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9119-9:
Condition iii) ensures that the truth-rules for the sentential connectives and quantifiers are satisfied within one and the same valuation ν s .
14. contentful
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
For, as just noted, the internal states that carry this information are usually thought of as ‘subdoxastic’ states because, although contentful, they are, unlike perceptual states, not tied to consciousness.
15. contextualism
• 2008, Patrick Allo, “Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9130-1:
As already hinted upon, the emphasis on Lewis’s brand of contextualism is all but a coincidence.
16. conventionalism
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
Of course, following Reichenbach’s discussion of metrical coordinative definitions, it has been generally agreed that there is a certain conventionality in space time theories and Lyre and Eynck point out that the theories they discuss “lie somewhere on a continuum with the doctrines of conventionalism and underdetermination at its two extremes”.
17. counterfactually
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
All they do is to emphasize the causal link between experience and the relevant belief by expressing it counterfactually: If S ’s experience had been different, S would have had a different belief (with a different content a la (P1)).
18. decompositional
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
To begin with, Reynolds’ decompositional strategy invoking sub-skills such as various visual recognitional capacities (as in Marr’s theory of vision) seems to be an appeal to the so-called ‘unconscious’ processes that lead up to experience and eventually to belief.
19. deductivist
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
One may however discern two major divisions within the deductivist approach depending on how the notion of content is to be understood as one’s view of the nature of content would directly bear on how one thinks that content is structured.
20. defensibility
• 2008, Patrick Allo, “Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9130-1:
Yet, in Hintikka’s own formulation, a largely similar system is obtained by combining model-sets with a notion of epistemic defensibility.
21. detectability
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
What then is the relevance of the experimental demonstration of the detectability of 2π rotations by Werner et al.
22. disanalogy
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
One disanalogy, with such skills as piano playing, concerns the difficulty of spelling out the relevant rules for the experience-belief transition.
23. disjointness
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
30 Together these two results point to disjointness of representations as the source of the limitation on the superposition principle.
24. disquotation
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
According to Quine (1992, p. 80) Tarski’s semantic theory of truth captures what is important in the correspondence theory of truth (i. e. , disquotation) and in so doing makes truth relative to a language or theory, that is, the correspondence is between a language and reality as described by a particular theoretical framework.
25. disquotational
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
Halback ( 1999 ) points out that the disquotational notion of truth is just a tool for expressing infinite conjunctions and can contribute nothing to our knowledge of non-semantical facts.
26. eigenbasis
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
Leaving aside many nuances, the “only if” part is replaced by the rule that when a quantum (sub)system is described by a reduced density operator ρ, the observables determinate on that (sub)system are those that commute with all of the projectors onto an eigenbasis of ρ.
27. evidentially
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
Moser’s initial response is to say that one’s subjective nonconceptual contents, C , can make a proposition, P , evidentially probable to some extent for one, i. e. , being an evidential probability-maker for P , in virtue of those contents being explained for one by P .
28. evolute
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
For if the Hamiltonian for the system is (essentially) self-adjoint then the time evolute of every vector in the Hilbert space—regardless of whether or not it has components in different superselection sectors—is uniquely defined for all time; and if the Hamiltonian is not (essentially) self-adjoint there is no quantum dynamics—unless the boundary conditions for the problem pick out a particular self-adjoint extension, reverting to the previous case.
29. explanationist
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
The explanationist strategy has to be supplemented with further constraints to identify genuine justifiers from among these candidates but Moser’s account lacks such a fastidious tendency.
30. explanatorily
• 2008, Josefa Toribio, “State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3:
Crowther 2006 ) that my claim that T1’s coherence is bought at the price of inadequacies in content attribution begs the question against the T1 theorist by simply assuming that T1’s content must be of a kind whose attribution is not answerable to facts about the subject’s experience—but is answerable instead to facts that depend on the theorist’s explanatorily successful descriptions.
31. externalist
• 2008, Josefa Toribio, “State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3:
One possible way out would be to appeal to some suitable form of externalist epistemology—based e. g. on facts about reliable empirical connections between the creatures’ responsive dispositions and the content of their experiences—to try to explain just how the content of perceptual experiences informs these subjects’ intentional behaviour.
32. foundationalist
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
32 Moser offers a broadly foundationalist account of epistemic justification in which the justification of empirical propositions are ultimately provided by the nonpropositional evidential bases.
33. guaranties
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
In summary, the natural evolution of language guaranties that the community will generally agree on the meaning, and the truth value, of observation sentences.
34. hypercompute
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Adam Olszewski, Jan Wolenski, and Robert Janusz (eds): Church’s Thesis After 70 Years”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9129-7:
Whether physical processes can hypercompute, i. e. compute Turing uncomputable functions “ultimately depends upon the causal (versus formal) structure of the world” (p. 144).
35. indubitability
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
Thus, epistemic justification is thought to be supervenient on such properties as indubitability, coherence, being appropriately caused by experience, being produced by a reliable process, and so on.
36. inequivalence
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
42 But perhaps a better strategy for the advocate of the algebraic approach is not to be defensive but to take the offensive and declare victory: declare that the unitary inequivalence of representations with different mass values proves that there is a superselection rule for mass in the case of a Klein–Gordon field; and more generally, claim that the superiority of the algebraic approach is manifested in the fact that it is able to reveal superselection rules that are not captured—at least not in any obvious way—by traditional methods which emphasize group-theoretic/symmetry considerations.
37. inequivalent
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
But (the argument would go) if unitarily inequivalent representations are going to contribute to a genuine superselection rule—even a weak one—they must be distinguished by some feature that makes for a real physical difference, and this difference can be expected to provide a basis for regarding all of the E j as in-principle measurable and, thus, elements of the observable algebra.
38. inferentially
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
There are, on the one hand, the conceptualists who claim that the content of experience is conceptual (with concepts generally understood as the inferentially relevant constituents of intentional states like beliefs) and there are those, the nonconceptualists, who deny this.
39. internalism
• 2008, Josefa Toribio, “State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3:
In fleshing out the relations of perceptual justification and perceptual content attribution, both contenders thus grant epistemic internalism.
40. internalist
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
Early on in his paper, when professing to adhere to an internalist conception of justification, he says this position “may be argued for from a deontological conception of epistemic acceptability”.
41. interpretability
• 2008, Kai F. Wehmeier, “Wittgensteinian Tableaux, Identity, and Co-Denotation”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9118-x:
From the less neutral vantage point of someone wishing to argue that identity is not a relation, one might use the interpretability of FOL = in W-logic to defuse the objection that banning the identity symbol leads to a crippling of logic’s expressive power.
42. interpretational
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
The issue is both delicate and pregnant with interpretational significance since it is related to the existence of paraparticles.
43. intersubjectively
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
As a result of this harmony we generally trust our senses and agree intersubjectively on the truth or falsity of observation sentences.
44. intertranslatability
• 2008, Kai F. Wehmeier, “Wittgensteinian Tableaux, Identity, and Co-Denotation”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9118-x:
It should be noted that the mere existence of a sound and complete calculus for W-logic comes as no surprise at all, given the intertranslatability with FOL = .
45. intertranslatable
• 2008, Kai F. Wehmeier, “Wittgensteinian Tableaux, Identity, and Co-Denotation”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9118-x:
As was first pointed out by Hintikka, the logic thus defined (which, following Wehmeier ( 2004 ), we refer to as Wittgensteinian or W-logic) is intertranslatable with FOL = .
46. intertranslateable
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
The fact that some of a group of such theories are intertranslateable, and some not, may be of some interest in terms of just how creative we humans are, but it seems to be a difference that doesn’t make much difference when it comes to choosing between empirically equivalent theories.
47. intertranslation
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
If all our acceptable theories are on similar evidential footings (neither the theory nor the theory language is fixed by the relevant evidence) then the distinction between notationally indeterminate theories and underdetermined theories comes down to just the fact that intertranslation is possible in the former but not the latter.
48. irresolubly
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
Quine’s position here is one of vacillating between his sectarian and ecumenical positions, he says: “The fantasy of irresolubly rival systems of the world is a thought experiment out beyond where linguistic usage has been crystallized by use.
49. justifiers
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
The explanationist strategy has to be supplemented with further constraints to identify genuine justifiers from among these candidates but Moser’s account lacks such a fastidious tendency.
50. kinematical
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
Physics differs from metaphysics by confining itself to articulating the kinematical and dynamical possibility structures for our world, and among the most important questions about these structures for quantum physics is whether superselection rules apply.
51. metalinguistic
• 2008, Kai F. Wehmeier, “Wittgensteinian Tableaux, Identity, and Co-Denotation”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9118-x:
Co-denotation, so conceived, clearly has a metalinguistic flavor, much like the notion of identity used by Frege in the Begriffsschrift (Frege 1879 ) (also symbolized by the triple bar).
52. noncompositional
• 2008, Josefa Toribio, “State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3:
As more recent advocates of the traditional nonconceptualist view like to put it, the content of perceptual experiences is essentially noncompositional or iconic (Hanna 2008 ; Heck 2007 ).
53. nonconceptual
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
When I look around, the result is not just that I come to be in a state with a certain content, but that I come to have a presentational attitude towards a particular nonconceptual content; then there is an inference or transition—call it whatever you like—from perceptual state to some belief I recognize it to underwrite.
54. nonconceptualism
• 2008, Josefa Toribio, “State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3:
It is not my intention to argue for perceptual nonconceptualism here, or to try show that it is a well-defined position.
55. nonconceptualist
• 2008, Josefa Toribio, “State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3:
As more recent advocates of the traditional nonconceptualist view like to put it, the content of perceptual experiences is essentially noncompositional or iconic (Hanna 2008 ; Heck 2007 ).
56. nonconceptualists
• 2008, Josefa Toribio, “State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3:
But for both perceptual conceptualists and nonconceptualists, only facts about how a subject grasps the world in experience can justify a subject’s perceptual beliefs and explain the subject’s intentional behaviour.
57. nondoxastic
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
This problem equally afflicts the application of supervenience in resolving the problem of nondoxastic justification.
58. nonlocality
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
2006 ) or the implications of superselection rules for quantum information theory where it seems that the degree of entanglement is constrained by superselection rules (see Bartlett and Wiseman 2003 ) and that the standard notion of quantum nonlocality has to be modified when superselection rules are present (see Verstraete and Cirac 2003 ).
59. nonoconceptual
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
But how could one form such beliefs if the content of experience is supposed to be nonoconceptual?
60. nonpropositional
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
32 Moser offers a broadly foundationalist account of epistemic justification in which the justification of empirical propositions are ultimately provided by the nonpropositional evidential bases.
61. nonseparable
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
Moving to nonseparable Hilbert spaces is an option, but adopting this move means that some of the fundamental results used in characterizing superselection rules—such as Theorem 3—are no longer available.
62. notationally
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
If all our acceptable theories are on similar evidential footings (neither the theory nor the theory language is fixed by the relevant evidence) then the distinction between notationally indeterminate theories and underdetermined theories comes down to just the fact that intertranslation is possible in the former but not the latter.
63. observability
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
This puts the lower limit of observability somewhere below the size of an atom.
64. observationally
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Adam Olszewski, Jan Wolenski, and Robert Janusz (eds): Church’s Thesis After 70 Years”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9129-7:
Then “the scope of physical computation will be delimited by those input-output relations between measurable quantities which are observationally accessible and experimentally determinable” (p. 208).
65. paraparticles
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
The details are too technical to review here, but they hold more than a little physical interest since they are crucial in deciding whether there can be paraparticles which do not obey either Fermi or bosonic statistics.
66. precisification
• 2008, R. W. Fischer, “Joseph LaPorte, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9128-8:
The terms that we use at any given time are vague to some degree or other; new information prompts precisification.
67. prescientifically
• 2008, R. W. Fischer, “Joseph LaPorte, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9128-8:
The majority of what we prescientifically called ‘water’ has more than one microstructural feature that we could have concluded distinguishes the true from the spurious samples believed to be water.
68. psychologism
• 2008, Darrell P. Rowbottom, “On the Proximity of the Logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ Interpretations of Probability”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9117-y:
I suggest that the key differences between the (Keynesian) logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views are in domain of the philosophy of logic; and that the genuine disagreement seems to be over Platonism versus nominalism (within weak psychologism).
69. rationalisms
• 2008, Darrell P. Rowbottom, “On the Proximity of the Logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ Interpretations of Probability”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9117-y:
Compared to past rationalisms, it is more cautious and disciplined.
70. reducibly
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
In terms of the above apparatus, this means that ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}({\mathcal {O}})}$ is a proper subalgebra of ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {B}}({\mathcal {H}})}$ (the algebra of all bounded operators on ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}}$) and, thus, ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}({\mathcal {O}})}$ acts reducibly on ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}},}$ i.e.
71. reliabilism
• 2008, Patrick Allo, “Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9130-1:
In counterfactual approaches, forcing comes in at two points: tracking the truth puts some stringent constraints on belief (indeed, a much stronger constraint than reliabilism does) and thus avoids their Gettierization, whereas the proviso that such tracking need only be in place in close worlds, takes care of sceptical concerns.
72. reliabilist
• 2008, Patrick Allo, “Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9130-1:
Extremely simplified, one way a reliabilist can incorporate forcing is by specifying that knowledge-yielding methods need only be reliable in normal worlds (with further room for variation as to where gaining truth and avoiding error need to come in).
73. retrodictions
• 2008, Holger Andreas, “Another Solution to the Problem of Theoretical Terms”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9119-9:
With respect to the predictions and retrodictions at the observational level there is thus no difference between the original theory and its Ramsey-sentence.
74. semantical
• 2008, Holger Andreas, “Another Solution to the Problem of Theoretical Terms”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9119-9:
In essence, the problem is a semantical circle that concerns the relation between the meaning of theoretical terms and the meaning of axioms in which these terms occur.
75. specifiable
• 2008, Josefa Toribio, “State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3:
The question of what is required for a notion of perceptual content to be sensitive to how things appear to the subject in experience is orthogonal to the question of whether or not the content of non-linguistic creatures’ perceptual experiences could be linguistically, and hence conceptually specifiable.
76. standardly
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Adam Olszewski, Jan Wolenski, and Robert Janusz (eds): Church’s Thesis After 70 Years”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9129-7:
The term hypercomputation is standardly used for a physical computation that transcends the limitations of Church’s thesis.
77. subalgebras
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
The proof of the converse starts from the observation that the abelian subalgebras of ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}}$ are partially ordered by inclusion and then uses Zorn’s lemma to conclude that there is an abelian subalgebra ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {A}}}$ that is maximal abelian in ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}},}$ i. e.
78. subdoxastic
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
But this does not square well with Reynolds’ explanation of the way we arrive at our justified beliefs in terms of sub-skills that involve rule-governed subdoxastic processes and states whose contents are, by definition, not phenomenologically salient.
79. subrepresentation
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
${\displaystyle \pi _{\omega _{\rho }}}$ is a reducible representation that is a subrepresentation of the direct sum representation ${\displaystyle \pi _{\psi _{1}}\oplus \pi _{\psi _{2}},}$ and ${\displaystyle \pi _{\omega _{\varrho }}({\mathfrak {B}}({\mathcal {H))}}^{\prime \prime }\subset \pi _{\psi _{1}}({\mathfrak {B}}({\mathcal {H))}}^{\prime \prime }\oplus \pi _{\psi _{2}}({\mathfrak {B}}({\mathcal {H))}}^{\prime \prime }}$ where the inclusion is proper; in particular, the projectors from ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {H}}_{_{\pi _{\psi _{1}}}}\oplus {\mathcal {H}}_{\pi _{\psi _{2}}}}$ onto the selection sectors are not in ${\displaystyle \pi _{\omega _{\varrho }}({\mathfrak {B}}({\mathcal {H))}}^{\prime \prime }\cap \pi _{\omega _{\varrho }}({\mathfrak {B}}({\mathcal {H))}}^{\prime }.}$
80. superpositions
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
A fifth notion of superselection rule—SSRV—says that the relative phases of superpositions of vectors belonging to different superselection sectors of ${\displaystyle \oplus _{j}{\mathcal {H}}_{j}}$ are unobservable: for ${\displaystyle \psi _{m}\in {\mathcal {H}}_{m}}$ and ${\displaystyle \psi _{n}\in {\mathcal {H}}_{n}}$ define ${\displaystyle \psi _{\lambda }^{mn}:={\frac {1}{\sqrt {2}}}(\psi _{m}+e^{i\lambda }\psi _{n});}$ then if m  ≠ n , for all ${\displaystyle A\in {\mathfrak {M}}({\mathcal {O}})}$ and any ${\displaystyle \lambda _{1},\lambda _{2}\in {\mathbb {R} },(\psi _{\lambda _{1}}^{mn},A\psi _{\lambda _{2}}^{mn})=(\psi _{\lambda _{2}}^{mn},A\psi _{\lambda _{1}}^{mn}).}$
81. superselected
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
Indeed, Landsman rejects the modal semantics in favor of the rule that all and only those observables whose operators are self-adjoint and are superselected in the sense that they belong to the center of the von Neumann algebra of observables have definite values.
82. superselection
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
No attempt was made to say directly what ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {O}}}$ and ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}({\mathcal {O}})}$ are; rather ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {O}}}$ was taken as given, ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}({\mathcal {O}})}$ was constructed as ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {O}}^{\prime \prime },}$ and then superselection rules of various strengths were characterized in terms of features of ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}({\mathcal {O}}).}$
83. supersymmetries
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
A possible case where the hypothesis of commutativity of supersymmetries is violated is discussed by van Fraassen ( 1991 , Ch. 11).
84. supervaluations
• 2008, Holger Andreas, “Another Solution to the Problem of Theoretical Terms”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9119-9:
In the domain of valuations which are supervaluations with respect to a certain partial valuation the axioms of classical logic remain valid.
85. supervenience
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
This problem equally afflicts the application of supervenience in resolving the problem of nondoxastic justification.
86. supervenient
• 2008, Hamid Vahid, “Experience and the Space of Reasons: The Problem of Non-Doxastic Justification”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9121-2:
How is the mere postulation of a supervenient dependence relation between justification and non-epistemic properties supposed to explain how nondoxastic states can confer something on belief (i. e. , justification) which they themselves do not possess.
87. symplectically
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
For an accessible example from QFT, the reader may wish to consider the construction of the algebra of symplectically smeared fields for the case of a Klein–Gordon field in Wald ( 1994 ).
88. synchronically
• 2008, Darrell P. Rowbottom, “On the Proximity of the Logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ Interpretations of Probability”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9117-y:
Central to understanding this is the well-known Dutch Book Argument, explained in detail in Gillies ( 2000 , pp. 53–65) and criticised in Hájek 2005 and Rowbottom 2007 , according to which a rational agent must select betting quotients that are (synchronically) coherent, i. e. such that she cannot be forced to lose no matter what occurs.
89. translatability
• 2008, Kai F. Wehmeier, “Wittgensteinian Tableaux, Identity, and Co-Denotation”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9118-x:
From a philosophically neutral position, the mutual translatability of W-logic and FOL = can be taken to show how the content of the identity symbol in first-order logic can be carved up in various ways, and be distributed between quantifiers and variables (as well as, where appropriate, a co-denotation predicate) so as to render ‘=’ superfluous.
90. uncomputable
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Adam Olszewski, Jan Wolenski, and Robert Janusz (eds): Church’s Thesis After 70 Years”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9129-7:
Whether physical processes can hypercompute, i. e. compute Turing uncomputable functions “ultimately depends upon the causal (versus formal) structure of the world” (p. 144).
91. underdescribed
• 2008, R. W. Fischer, “Joseph LaPorte, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9128-8:
LaPorte shows that some of these cases—like Putnam’s Twin Earth—are seriously underdescribed; others—like the jade/jadeite/nephrite example–are historically inaccurate.
92. underdetermination
• 2008, Ian McDiarmid, “Underdetermination and Meaning Indeterminacy: What is the Difference?”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9122-1:
” Quine claims that underdetermination of theory by evidence is also supported by his holistic view of theories which says that the empirical content of a theory is shared by the whole theory, that is, it does not reside separately in individual sentences.
93. underdetermine
• 2008, R. W. Fischer, “Joseph LaPorte, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9128-8:
As before, now that the empirical data is in, we can see that the various components of the meaning of ‘water’ underdetermine what we should say about its referent.
94. undividedly
• 2008, Sven Ove Hansson, “Adam Olszewski, Jan Wolenski, and Robert Janusz (eds): Church’s Thesis After 70 Years”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9129-7:
Several contributions, including those by Copeland and by Bringsjord and Arkoudas, deal with issues of this nature, but the only chapter that focuses undividedly on them is that by Darren Abramson (“Church’s Thesis and Philosophy of Mind”).
95. unitaries
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
We have seen that ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {O}}^{\prime }={\mathcal {O}}^{\prime \prime \prime }={\mathfrak {M}}({\mathcal {O}})^{\prime }}$ (see Theorem 1) and, therefore, ${\displaystyle {\mathcal {U}}}$ comprises the non-trivial unitaries in ${\displaystyle {\mathfrak {M}}({\mathcal {O}})^{\prime }.}$
96. unitarily
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
But (the argument would go) if unitarily inequivalent representations are going to contribute to a genuine superselection rule—even a weak one—they must be distinguished by some feature that makes for a real physical difference, and this difference can be expected to provide a basis for regarding all of the E j as in-principle measurable and, thus, elements of the observable algebra.
97. univalence
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
When it was realized that time reversal might not be a valid symmetry, the univalence superselection rule was reestablished on the basis of rotational invariance (see Sect. 12 ).
98. unrecounted
• 2008, John Earman, “Superselection Rules for Philosophers”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9124-z:
Some of the untidiness that goes unrecounted in both physics and philosophy of science texts will be revealed in Sects. 11 and 12 .
99. unsolvability
• 2008, Patrick Allo, “Vincent Hendricks, Mainstream and Formal Epistemology”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9130-1:
As a matter of fact, the degree to which a method succeeds to deal with local underdetermination can be seen as a measure of the degree of unsolvability of epistemic problems relative to different success-criteria.
100. veridically
• 2008, Josefa Toribio, “State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism”, in Erkenntnis, volume 69, number 3, DOI:10.1007/s10670-008-9120-3:
] one thinks that tomatoes are red—and one’s possessing which partially explains one’s ability to think that thought—is also exercised when one veridically perceives a ripe tomato, and whether it would be impossible for one to perceive the tomato as one does were one not able to think as one is” (Heck 2007 , p. 123).