Jump to navigation Jump to search
- (epistemology) The belief that certain disagreements (even about facts) ultimately stem from differing values, and therefore cannot be resolved as factual disagreements.
- 1989, Raymond Martin, The Past Within Us: An Empirical Approach to Philosophy of History, Princeton University Press, →ISBN, page 97:
- Most who have argued for evaluativism have been interested in establishing skepticism, and have assumed that evaluativism implied skepticism.
- 2007, Stathis Psillos, “Putting a Bridle on Irrationality: An Appraisal of van Fraassen's New Epistemology”, in Bradley Monton, editor, Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, Oxford University Press, →ISBN, page 154:
- [E]valutivism makes plain that any attempt to justify a rule (ultimately by a rule-circular argument) will be an attempt for rules we value and will depend on rules we value (our basic inferential rules).
- 2008, Carrie S Jenkins, Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge, Oxford University Press, →ISBN, page 68:
- There is prima facie something deeply unappealing about evaluativism: our intuitions rebel at the suggestion that reasonableness is 'not a factual property' and that '[i]n calling a rule reasonable we are evaluating it, and all that makes sense to ask about is what we value'.
For quotations of use of this term, see Citations:evaluativism.