introspectability

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English[edit]

Alternative forms[edit]

Etymology[edit]

introspect +‎ -ability

Noun[edit]

introspectability (uncountable)

  1. The quality of being subject to introspection.
    1. (programming, object-oriented programming) The quality of supporting type introspection.
      • 2000, Roger Teichmann, Logic, Cause and Action, ISBN 0521785103, page 93:
        This shows, I think, that sensitivity to the argument from soft introspectability is an untenable halfway house; we must accept strict introspectability or nothing.
      • 2006, Jonathan Gratch, Intelligent Virtual Agents: 6th International Conference, IVA, ISBN 3540375937, page 155:
        Besides the open question of the full introspectability of arbitrary application code, there is another mental obstacle: conventional programmers consider that dynamic symbolic models are mere gadget applications, “too slow and not professional" but this situation could change with the maturity of web-based scripting (like wikis, active technology, ...).
      • 2010, M. Papazoglou, ‎Klaus Pohl, ‎& Michael Parkin, Service Research Challenges and Solutions for the Future Internet, ISBN 3642175996, page 162:
        It includes subfactors such as introspectability, controlability, and notifiability of the Web service and of the platform, measured by both taking into account the possibility that these sub-factors can be achieved and whether they are actually achieved.
    2. (psychology) The quality of being accessible to self-examination and awareness.
      • 2007, UMI, Eliminative Materialism and the Distinction Between Common Sense and Science, ISBN 0549267883:
        Introspectability cannot be the mark of the mental because one can introspect physical states, like indigestion or other internal physical events in the body.
      • 2013, Peter Carruthers, The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, ISBN 0199685142:
        Moreover, everyone will now accept that some aspects of our mental lives aren't even accessible to introspection. So transparent-access theorists need to provide an account o the distingction between those mental events that are, in principle, transparently accessible and those that are not. In effect, they need to provide us with a criterion of introspectability.
      • 2014, David Bennett & ‎Christopher Hill, Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness, ISBN 026202778X, page 342:
        For example, is introspectability a necessary condition for presence to consciousness?